UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
5-2011

Taming the waters that taketh from the devil’s playground: A
history of flood control in Clark County, Nevada, 1955-2010
Jarvis Marlow
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Civil and Environmental Engineering Commons, United States History Commons, and the
Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Repository Citation
Marlow, Jarvis, "Taming the waters that taketh from the devil’s playground: A history of flood control in
Clark County, Nevada, 1955-2010" (2011). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and
Capstones. 950.
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/2293572

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones by
an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

TAMING THE WATERS THAT TAKETH FROM THE DEVIL’S PLAYGROUND:
A HISTORY OF FLOOD CONTROL IN
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA,
1955-2010

by

Jarvis Marlow

Bachelors of Science, Finance
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
1998
Bachelors of Arts, History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2005

A thesis submittal in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the

Master of Arts in History
Department of History
College of Liberal Arts

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2011

Copyright by Jarvis Marlow 2011
All Rights Reserved

THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

We recommend the thesis prepared under our supervision by

Jarvis Marlow
entitled

Taming the Waters that Taketh from the Devil’s Playground: A History
of Flood Control in Clark County, Nevada, 1955-2010
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in History
Department of History

Eugene P. Moehring, Committee Chair
Andrew G. Kirk, Committee Member
Joseph A. Fry, Committee Member
Barbara G. Brents, Graduate Faculty Representative

Ronald Smith, Ph. D., Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies
and Dean of the Graduate College

May 2011

ii

ABSTRACT
Taming the Waters that Taketh from the Devil’s Playground:
A History of Flood Control in
Clark County, Nevada,
1955-2010
by
Jarvis Marlow
Dr. Eugene Moehring, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The Las Vegas valley is the driest metropolis in the United States, with an annual
rainfall of less than five inches. A large majority of the annual precipitation occurs
between May and September in the form of high intensity thunderstorms. Since the
founding of Las Vegas in 1905 until the formation of the Clark County Regional Flood
Control District in 1986, the five jurisdictions that make up the Las Vegas valley: Las
Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City, and Clark County, struggled to
manage stormwater. The principal defect was that they reflected the particular whims of
each government entity, largely ignoring the nagging geologic characteristics that made
the valley so susceptible to flooding. Often, dikes and flood channels built in one city
were not integrated with those in the adjoining city. After devastating floods in 1983 and
1984 exploited the gaps in the “patch-work” flood control system, a group of progressive
minded politicians, engineers, and citizens aggressively campaigned for the formation of
a regional flood control district. In 1986 Clark County residents approved a one-quarter
of one-percent sales tax increase for the funding for the flood control district. Over the
past quarter-century, the Clark County Regional Flood Control District funded a network
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of detention basins and flood channels throughout Clark County, which helped manage
the massive physical expansion of the Las Vegas valley in the 1990s and early 2000s.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Noah didn’t fool around when God gave him news that it was going to rain, he had
better build an ark. Unfortunately, Clark County gets no warning when it’s going to
flood.”1

Figure 1. July 3, 1975 Caesars Palace Flood
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)

1

Laura Wigard, reporter, Las Vegas Review Journal. August 24, 1986.
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February 9, 2009 was a cold damp Monday morning in Las Vegas. So when Gale
Frazier heard from his public relations manager Betty Hollister that not one local media
outlet called for his opinion nor was one complaint received from a private resident, he
was ecstatic. Frazier, the General Manager of the Clark County Regional Flood Control
District (CCRFCD), expected a full morning covering calls about the previous weekend’s
heavy rainfall. During his twenty-one years working on flood control in Clark County, it
was the first time no one had questioned the effectiveness of the county’s flood control
plan.
The CCRFCD is twenty years into completing the flood control master plan, with
another thirty-years required to build out the current system of detention basins and
channels. But already Las Vegas is experiencing far fewer flood problems than in
previous decades. In fact, 2003 was the last deadly flood event not contained by the
regional flood control system -- “a success,” Frazier noted in a 2009 interview, “that all
Southern Nevadans should celebrate.” This is a far cry from the early 1990s when
residents mocked the District’s master plan for being, “just a day late and dollar short.”
As far back as 1959, when the first regional flood control measures were proposed for
Clark County, residents continued to suffer because of the mismanagement of funds, lack
of cooperation between the towns in the county and lax building code enforcement.2
It can be difficult for new residents to see flood control’s benefits, given that the
last major storm to cripple the region came in 2003. The region experienced a massive
thunderstorm in August 2007 that produced the same intense runoff as the 2003 storm,
2

Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape
recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. Quoting Marian Timmerman, Las Vegas resident whose in
1990 friend was swept into a flood channel at the intersection of Topaz Street and Russell Road. “Flood
projects chase decades of neglect Projects OK’d along washes.” Las Vegas Review Journal, August 11,
1991. 1A
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but was subsequently contained by the region’s flood control system. In addition, Las
Vegas is the driest metropolitan area in the nation, with the lowest annual precipitation
rate of four inches. Not surprisingly, over Las Vegas’ one-hundred-year history there
have been residents, developers and even city planners who actually scoffed at the notion
that it could flood in Southern Nevada.
This thesis traces the history of flooding in the Las Vegas valley and the vital role
comprehensive regional flood control planning has played since the creation of the
CCRFCD in 1986. More specifically, this work looks at the District’s management,
construction, and community involvement since 1987 and what is planned for the coming
decades to protect current and future residents. It will also explore the ramifications of
CCRFCD’s fiscal and managerial success, which made it one of the preeminent land-use
agencies in the West and one that prompted other cities like Denver, Phoenix, Riverside,
and Albuquerque to adopt many of the District’s best practices. At the federal level, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself has been relying increasingly on
the modeling and engineering from Clark County to support its own flood plain mapping.
FEMA currently borrows or recruits CCRFCD and local flood control staff to assist other
communities, especially in the South, to adopt regional building standards and
stormwater conveyance systems to manage 100-year flood events, while preparing the
citizens for the possibility of 200 and 500-year flooding events. This paper’s final section
will discuss the expanding role of CCRFCD to support the various environmental and
sustainability agencies in Southern Nevada.3
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The term “100-year flood (event) will be defined further in the piece; however, it is important for the
reader to understand the phrase is a statistical benchmark for a given region’s probability of receiving a
major flooding event in a given year. Peter Jackson, Senior Engineering Associate, City of Las Vegas
Flood Control. Interview by author, March 25, 2009.
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Successful flood control is not measured by stopping stormwater from entering an
urban community; it comes from managing the water flow once it enters the network.
Whether it is rivers and streams, pipes and culverts, or channels and detention basins –
management of rain water in urban networks can be complicated by developers and city
planners adopting standards without answering two vital questions: why does it flood,
and were does it flood? For eighty-years, prior to the formation of the CCRFCD, Las
Vegas developers and planners largely failed to address these questions.
Records of flooding in Southern Nevada date back to the late 1800s, with the first
official accounts coming shortly after the city’s birth in 1905. But it was not until a series
of deadly floods in the mid-1950s that local officials and urban planners began to realize
that earlier flood control measures, which relied on lessons learned from river flooding in
the East, failed to protect property and lives, as Las Vegas began to leapfrog washes that
once lay beyond the city limits. As the town grew into a vibrant metropolis with a dense
commercial corridor and radial residential growth patterns, the community developed
separate work-life environments that straddled natural flood plains. The creation of the
CCRFCD in 1986 facilitated the rapid physical expansion of the community’s network in
the 1990s up through present day by controlling and isolating flood waters in a regional
system of detention basins and conveyance channels, allowing for growth to occur in
expansive floodplains once designated as uninhabitable. Thanks to funds generated from
one-quarter of one percent of the sales tax collected in Clark County since 1987 the
CCRFCD manages flooding hazards through land-use controls, floodplain management,
and revising the system’s construction “Master Plan” every five years, which allows for
refocusing efforts per current development needs.
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This thesis traces the evolution of the community’s flood control practices
following the massive 1955 flood, first, with the passing of the Nevada Revised Statute
543 (NRS 543) in 1959 which established flood control policies at the state level. This
law mandated that Nevada cooperate with the federal government to prevent loss of life
and property, disruption of commerce, interruption of transportation and communication
and waste of water resulting from floods. In that same year the United States Army Corps
of Engineer released its Report on Survey for Flood Control: Las Vegas Wash and
Tributaries, which depicted a community paralyzed by a reliance on federal funding. In
1962 local leaders proposed funding the Corps’ master flood plan, but voters rejected that
bond issue, resulting in three decades of reactive flood control measures. This work will
show that the failure to adopt the Corps’ plan in the early 1960s allowed the CCRFCD in
1987 to implement a different and more effective plan that promoted the compact and
uniform physical expansion of the Las Vegas metropolitan area during the late 1980s,
1990s, and early 2000s. Emphasis will be placed on the small group of politicians,
planners, private citizens, and businessmen who brought the community together in 1986
to approve a sustainable funding mechanism for regional flood control. Finally, the work
will explore the success of the District’s fiscal policies, mission for the future, and its
cooperative efforts with FEMA, Southern Nevada Water Authority, and other
environmental agencies to protect people, property, and most importantly, the region’s
water supply.4

4

Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape
recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009. “Flood Hazard Analyses – Las Vegas Wash and Tributaries:
Special Report – History of Flooding, Clark County, Nevada 1905-1975,” provided by CCRFDC
(document available on CCRFDC website), 1. NRS 543.020 Declaration of Policy found on the world wide
web at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-543.html.
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The Las Vegas Valley
In the past four decades the Las Vegas valley has experienced hyper-growth in its
population, economy, and physical layout. From 1986 to 2006 Las Vegas consistently
ranked as the fastest-growing metropolitan area in the United States. In the late 1990s,
Henderson and North Las Vegas were among the top five fastest growing cities in the
nation. Estimated to now host over 2 million inhabitants, Clark County’s population
doubled every decade after Las Vegas’s founding in 1905. Embodying western expansion
through urban-suburban sprawl, the Las Vegas metro area consists of the cities of Las
Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and unincorporated county lands that
include the world famous Las Vegas Strip and its suburbs. The metro area covers 600
square miles of the Mojave Desert and claims nearly every open piece of land from the
Spring Mountains in the west, to the Sheep Mountain range in the north, Lake Mead to
the east, and the growing area heading southward along Interstate 15 toward the
California state-line. Most of this land hosts single family neighborhoods and small to
medium commercial complexes.
Unfortunately for urban planners, Las Vegas is the most geographically isolated
metropolis in the continental United States, unlike earlier growth patterns seen in Los
Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco that resembled spokes on a wheel. With outer
communities connected by transportation and freight lines, Las Vegas developers
designed an urban network that grew by layers. Infrastructure costs tied to drilling
through the desert’s hard caliche soil virtually prohibited the development of large home
tracts miles beyond the existing network that were typical of other western metropolitan
areas. Even today, prime real estate in the valley sits on the ever expanding edge of the
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urban network. Consequently, the region’s growth pattern since the 1950s has primarily
remained radial.5

Figure 2. Color representation of population growth in Las Vegas valley
(Courtesy of Clark County Regional Flood Control District)

With no local commercial hubs, the community has fanned out from the central
resort corridor into suburbs (fig 2). As land in the core began selling for higher prices in

5

Kay Bandley, 50 year Las Vegas resident and residential home builder from the 1950s through the 1990s.
Interviewed by author, transcript, Las Vegas NV., April 12, 2009. Gale Frazier, Clark County Regional
Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., February
13, 2009.
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the 1950s and 1960s, commercial and residential developers expanded outward to the
virgin desert – a process that has continued until this present day. Early development off
Fremont Street in downtown Las Vegas headed eastward along Charleston Boulevard to
Sunrise Mountain, and along the Boulder Highway as well as westward up to and beyond
Decatur Boulevard and later Summerlin master planned community. Thanks to the Strip’s
growing influence, residential and commercial growth east of the great resorts traveled
southward along Maryland Parkway, Eastern Avenue, and other thoroughfares until the
late 1980s when the development of Green Valley finally linked Las Vegas and
Henderson population clusters. By the 1990s the valley’s southern rim experienced
massive expansion with Summerlin in the west and Anthem and Seven Hills in the east,
Southern Highlands, Mountains Edge, Rhodes Ranch, in the south. More recently, North
Las Vegas has enjoyed growth along the northern beltway, which connects the
communities of Centennial in the northwest and the master planned community at Aliante
in the far north, to Interstate 15 and U.S. 95.
The Land
Flood hazards in the arid Southwest are created when the land is altered by
surface paving, homes, and developers changing the land’s natural elevation. If the land
has been desert for thousands of years, and suddenly driveways and streets are introduced
where rain waters once flowed, the water will find new places to travel, not respecting
property or jurisdiction boundaries. Less than an inch of rain on the desert floor can be
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deadly if it comes in the form of a high-intensity, isolated thunderstorms, which are
commonly called micro-bursts or micro-cells.6
The topography of the Las Vegas metropolitan area is such that it is situated in a
natural depression, which is commonly referred to as “a bowl turned on its side.” When
stormwater, irrigation, commercial water run-off, and the nature stream systems enter the
valley it becomes part of the region’s watershed. Clark County has ten watersheds, the
Las Vegas valley watershed covers the greatest area.7 This thesis will primarily focus on
the Las Vegas valley watershed (fig 3), which ranges in elevation from 12,000 feet at the
peak of Mt. Charleston to 1,500 feet above sea-level at Lake Mead. To the west, the
valley is bordered by the Spring Mountains, which are 3,000 to 12,000 feet tall, and to the
north by the Ground Gunnery Range, whose peaks rise above 7,000 feet. The Black
Mountains comprise the valley’s southern rim while Sunrise Mountain serves as the
eastern boarder.
The Las Vegas valley watershed area is approximately 1,520 square miles; its
washes and stormwater channels drain through the urban core into the Las Vegas Wash
southeast of metro area. All the washes are fed by urban runoff, shallow groundwater,
reclaimed water and stormwater. The Las Vegas Wash, which is classified as an urban
river, includes a wetlands area that historically has been the “kidneys” of the local
environment -- cleansing the water that flows through it, filtering out harmful residues
from fertilizers, oils, and other contaminants. The Las Vegas Wash is twelve miles long

6

“Cooperation Urged to Curb Drainage Woes” Las Vegas Review Journal, October 14, 1986. Gale Frazier,
Clark County Regional Flood Control District - General Manager, interview by author, tape recorded, Las
Vegas, NV., February 13, 2009.
7
Lake Mead, Grand Wash, Lower Virgin, Muddy, Meadow Valley Wash, Las Vegas Wash, HavasuMohave Lakes, Piute Wash, Sand Spring-Tikaboo Valleys, Ivanpah-Pahrump Valleys.
http://cfpub.epa.gov/surf/county.cfm?fips_code=32003
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and empties into Lake Mead. In the metro area there are eight major washes that feed into
the Las Vegas Wash; Central, Lower Wash, Duck Creek, North Basin, Range Wash,
Gowan, Pittman Wash, and the two largest, the Flamingo and Tropicana Wash (fig 4).8

Figure 3. Out line (white) of the Las Vegas Valley Watershed. 9

8
9

Las Vegas Wash Coordination Committee http://www.lvwash.org/html/what_chrono.html
Retrieved from the world wide web http://ufdp.dri.edu/projects/lvwash.htm
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Figure 4. An
n overview of
o the Las Vegas
V
Valleyy Watershed,, sub-watershhed boundarries,
naturaal channels and
a the proxiimity to Lakke Mead.10
Most of the valleyy’s natural washes
w
are foound at the end of alluviaal fans. Alluuvial
a the downsstream sectioon of a canyoon.
faans are areass at the base of a mountaain range or at
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“GIS and the Development of
o a Source Water Assessmennt Program” auuthors Marceloo Reginato andd
Thhomas Piechotta, University of
o Nevada Las Vegas. Retrievved from the world
w
wide webb
htttp://proceedings.esri.com/libbrary/userconf//proc02/pap04339/p0439.htm .
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Peter Jackson, of the City of Las Vegas Flood Control Department described alluvial
material as “decomposed mountains.” Over thousands of years, the deposits on the
canyon’s outflow creates a scattered mass resembling a hand-fan. Because there is little
or no vegetation on arid mountains to prevent erosion, when the stormwater or snow melt
flows down the steep slopes, large amounts of debris are transferred through canyons and
deposited on the outflow point at the mountain’s pass (fig 5). The fan is composed of
soul, rocks, small vegetation and boulders -- the debris causes the majority of the damage
during floods in the arid Southwest.11

Figure 5. Illustrates the debris deposit that forms the alluvial fan.12

11

Peter Jackson, Senior Engineering Associate; City of Las Vegas Flood Control, interview by author, tape
recording, Las Vegas, NV., March 25, 2009.
12
Image retrieved from the world wide web
http://lang.sbsun.com/projects/fireflood/graphics/alluvialfan.gif
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As the alluvial fan extends out from the mountain’s base, floods combined with
the decomposed material, act like a natural plow cutting out numerous washes in the
loosely compacted soil. Without the constant presence of water, the washes deteriorate by
erosion, become overgrown with vegetation, or destroyed by man-made development. All
these factors lessen the probability of future watersheds traveling thru the same wash.
The random flow patterns are very hazardous for communities that develop near an
alluvial fan. Virginia Valentine, the first CCRFCD General Manager and a former Clark
County Manager, noted in a 2010 interview that the problem with alluvial fans is there
are no channels: “It’s like pouring a glass of water on a table top, it goes every where.”
As the Las Vegas metropolitan area expanded in the early 1950s, more developers built
homes on the edge of alluvial fans, which unavoidably disturbed the natural washes and
exposed countless properties to major flood hazards. It was not until the mid-1960s that
local officials and engineers began studying the region’s hydrology, which involved the
interaction of water with natural and manmade landscapes.
Urban-hydrology is defined as the study of a region’s hydrological processes
affected by urbanization. Ever since humans have congregated together in towns and
cities they have attempted to change their immediate surroundings. Stormwater drainage
has always been a challenge for urban developers who are continually seeking a rapid and
efficient means to eliminate standing water from the built-up area. Achieving this
objective obviously depends primarily upon knowledge of the characteristics of heavy
rainfalls within a specific region. In 1956, Soil Conservation Service magazine published
a study of urban flooding. The article reported that since the 1930s, urbanizations had
increased the frequency of flooding by replacing the natural cover with smooth

13

impervious surfaces. Following the more widespread use of digital computers in the
1960s, scientists were able to compile relationships between rainfall and stormwater
runoff in a city’s network of streets and developed land.
Prior to the 1960s Las Vegas engineers, builders, and officials did not consider
the natural flow of stormwater that channeled run-offs southeastward toward Lake Mead.
With large stretches of desert between neighborhoods, engineers in the 1940s and 1950s
designed the early flood control measures to protect homes from the rainfall that fell
within a neighborhood’s boundaries. Contractors built channels and pipes to convey
upstream stormwater away from their homes, with no regard for the down-stream
properties. Little thought was given to connecting flood control structures across the
growing metro network, which instead became a patch-work system of channels, ditches,
and drainage pipes. Each jurisdiction in Clark County had its own priorities and did not
coordinate with one another to address regional flood hazards – a state of affairs that
continued until the formation of the CCRFCD in 1986.13
The Flood Waters
Thunderstorms in the Southwest occur during periods of hot weather between
May and September. Heavy rains fall on steep mountains, which in Las Vegas are located
west of town in the Spring Mountains and in the Sheep Mountains north of the metro
area. Rainwater then rapidly runs off the hard desert soils, which one expert calls “the
desert varnish,” through a system of smaller natural channels and washes, collecting in
one of the eight regional washes, and then concentrating in urbanized areas at lower
elevations. The lack of agriculture, along with caliche clay under the surface soil, inhibits
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water absorption. Over time, flood waters move large amounts of debris out of the
mountains and along the valley’s floor forming large “dry river beds.” During massive
storms these soil deposits and boulders are forced through the washes, potentially causing
more damage to property than floods near river systems, which are called riverine floods.
Both riverine and alluvial fan flooding occur in Nevada. The former begins when
a river rises and discharges large volumes through low-lying lands. Typically the river
rises over a period of hours or days before flooding adjacent lands. Commonly
experienced in the Midwestern states, flood waters overrun river banks or breach levees.
In Nevada, riverine flooding has occurred in the south along the Virgin River and in the
north along the Truckee River. Downtown Reno and the low-lying areas near the river
often experience riverine flooding during heavy rains and spring snow melt runoff. The
Truckee, a normally quiet stream that meanders gently through Reno and Washoe County
has had a history of periodic rampages since 1861. Significant floods over the past halfcentury have occurred in 1950, 1955, 1963, 1983, 1997, and 2005 – resulting in millions
of dollars in damage to downtown and to communities along the river. Flood waters rise
in the wake of early snow pack melting during unseasonably high heat fronts or intense
winter rain storms. Unlike flash floods that surprise Southern Nevadans, residents and
officials along the Truckee River have significant time to sandbag and evacuate low-lying
areas as the river rises.14
Waters levels through the Truckee River system are normally around six-feet
deep. In 1950 and then again in 1955, the river crested at twenty-six feet. Truckee floods
created so much damage over the past half-century that area governments worked
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together with California and federal officials to build upstream dams. Even with a
number of reservoirs west of Reno built to handle upriver flooding including Stampede,
Boca and Prosser, nothing stopped the deluge making its way down hill in 1997 and
2005. Every building in downtown Reno within three hundred yards north of the river
and one-hundred yards south of the river had been flooded at least once during this six
year period. The New Year’s Flood of 1997 created such devastation in the eastern part
of the valley, entire businesses were lost and Harrah’s Hotel and Casino as well as nearly
every casino along the river had to be closed until the waters receded. One of the major
reasons for downtown flooding is the bridge spanning the river from Booth Street and
East Second Street was built with aesthetics in mind, any large trees coming down the
river in a flood would get lodged and the river would pool behind the bridge as more and
more debris clogged the area.15
The alluvial fan flooding that affects Southern Nevada occurs when
thunderstorms drop large amounts of water in the mountains and higher elevations. The
flow quickly exits the canyons at a high velocity across the desert floor, collecting in the
Las Vegas Wash and then dumping into Lake Mead. Flash floods are more common in
the Southwest and have caused millions of dollars in property damage throughout the Las
Vegas metro area. Thunderstorms in Southern Nevada are not unique compared to the
rest of the arid Southwest; they usually occur in summer and are typically short lived and
very intense. Nonetheless, local flood control officials jokingly refer to thunderstorms in
this region as “popcorn” -- exploding with no warning. For example, on August 19, 2003,
three-inches of rain fell in ninety minutes northwest of downtown Las Vegas. Water
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meters in the affected area measured 3,000 cubic feet of water per second flowing down
Gowan Road. One cubic foot of water is 7.5-gallons or approximately the size of a
basketball in a box; there are roughly 3,000 cubic feet of water in a residential swimming
pool. The storm’s rapid release of rain in a forty-square mile area displaced air around the
rain-burst, knocking over trees along the outer edge of the storm’s ring. Less than fifeteen
miles away at the National Weather Service’s McCarran International Airport rain gauges
reported no precipitation.16
Since the major washes are dry most of the year in Southern Nevada and major
events such as the August 2003 storm do not occur each summer season, flood control
officials worry that newer residents are unaware of the flood potential beyond the
established system. The natural element of floods aside, Gale Frazier, the CCRFCD’s
general manager, believes the influx of people over the past fifty years from “wetter
climates” has played a major role in the human cost associated with floods. In a 2009
interview Frazier speculated that newer residents come from parts of the nation that
experience riverine flooding and underestimate the potential of flooding because they live
miles from the Colorado River and Lake Mead. In addition, Frazier believes that people
accustomed to riverine flooding react casually to flash floods as if they heard a radio alert
or viewed a television warning of a specific area that might experience rising water. But
unlike other America regions where rainfall is more frequent, storms in the Southwest hit
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very fast; they can also be extremely intense and it is virtually impossible to forecast
where the rain will fall. 17

Figure 6. CCRFCD public service advertisement

The public relations department at the CCRFCD produces community outreach
programs on the City of Las Vegas and Clark County public access television stations in
a format entitled “The Flood Channel.” This program is used to warn the public that most
storm damage and death occur beyond the storm event area and that standing water is
potentially deadly (fig 6). Betty Hollister, public relations manager for the CCRFCD,
notes that most emergency rescues during flood events typically happen with blue sky,
sunshine, and almost always down-stream from the storm event. During the August 2003
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flood, for instance, Juliette Lopez who stopped at the traffic light at Rainbow Boulevard
and Gowan Road, recalled water flowing near her tires’ rims. Lopez had to crawl onto
her roof and be rescued by a helicopter because by the time the light turned green the
water was up to the car’s windows.18

Figure 7. Juliette Lopez near the intersection of Rainbow and Gowan, August 19, 2003
(Photo credit given to John Locher, Las Vegas Review Journal)

Classifying Floods and the Types of Mitigation
Hydrologists measure the size of a flood in terms of recurrence intervals.
Mistakenly called “100-year floods,” storms are measured independently of one another based on the statistical probability of rainfall and water flow in a specific region, not on
the number of years between floods. For example, a 100-year flood has a one-percent
chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. The National Oceanic and
18
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) collects rain gauge data; in Clark County the
gauges are at McCarran International Airport. NOAA submits that information to the
National Weather Service to calculate the statistical flood probability of a 100-year event.
In Las Vegas, forty years of data have been collected. According to the National Weather
Service, the area’s 100-year standard is 2.77 inches of rain within a six-hour period.
Local engineers and flood control officials have classified eleven major events dating
back to 1960 as 100-year floods. Each event has caused more than a million dollars in
property damage. Prior to the CCRFCD, Frazier notes, many residents believed the
community was safe for 10, 15, 50 and even 100 years after a major storm event occurred
because weathermen and the media mistakenly claimed the probability of future floods.
To ensure increased levels of flood protection for residents, businesses and tourists from
the hazards of flooding in Clark County, the CCRFCD’s master construction plan since
1987 has designed all flood control facilities to handle Southern Nevada’s statistical 100year flood.19
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Figure 8. Lower Las Vegas Wash Detention Basin
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)

The structures that are used in Southern Nevada are common across the
Southwest: detention basins, earthen levees, and concrete-lined channels to control the
flow of water through an urban corridor. In 1985, engineers from James M. Montgomery
Consulting in Salt Lake City began looking at ways to manage the valley’s stormwater
flowing off an alluvial fan. They discovered that levees three or four feet in height
constructed along the edge of the fan corralled the water to a central point near the apex
of the fan. By building a detention basin at the apex to capture the water the levee system
blocked, the random flow patterns coming off the fan are illuminated. The basins also
served to capture massive amounts of potentially dangerous debris. Unlike dams, the
engineers design the system’s basins to release the flood water as it reaches an outflow
point at the downstream end of the basin. Without basins to capture the violent waters
originating in the higher elevations and slowing down the flow rates (fig 10), channels
would have to be deeper and wider, like the Los Angles River. However, the Los Angles
River, which was a natural flowing waterway through the city, was built in the bed of an
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actual river (fig 9). The channels that snake through the metro area of the Las Vegas
valley have to be much smaller to fit into existing flood control structures or installed
under road-ways. Most importantly the community can not afford to have channels
occupying scarce and very valuable land in the valley’s urban core (fig 11).20

Figure 9. The Los Angeles River
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Figure 10. Ann Road Detention Basin, northeast of Las Vegas.
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)

Figure 11. Workers building an underground storm drain in Northwest Las Vegas.
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)
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Many proponents of stormwater harvesting argue that Clark County is losing an
opportunity to use the flood waters collected in the basins for irrigating public lands.
Friends of the Desert Wetlands Parks, a local group formed by Norma Cox in the mid1990s, claims that stormwater flowing through the system of basins and concrete
channels enters the Las Vegas Wash with no filtering system to separate non-point
pollutants such as motor oil, fertilizer, and commercial chemicals. The wash’s natural
ecosystem is unable to properly clean the stormwater during heavy or sustained rain
storms. Nonetheless, the basins are designed to take the fast-flowing flood waters and
disperse their violent energy over its large floor. As the water’s velocity is drastically
reduced by pooling on the basin’s floor, it slowly rises toward the outflow point, spilling
into a system of conveyance channels that safely transport the water through the urban
core toward Lake Mead.21
The CCRFCD relies on accurate rainfall and stream gauge data. Presently, the
district manages 170 real time gauges in Clark County that cover 8,000 square miles of
mountains, desert, dry river beds and Lake Mead shoreline. Prior to 1989, the region only
had 3 gauges at McCarran International Airport. Las Vegas did not start collecting rain
gauge data until the Army Corps of Engineers presented its findings in the wake of the
June 1955 flood. When the hydrologists and engineers attempted to design the regional
system in the late 1980s they had little historical data, which forced them to fill in the
gaps of missing data with assumptions and rainfall modeling from other arid regions.
Once the CCRFCD began connecting the region’s existing structures in the early 1990s,
these earlier assumptions were proven wrong, causing some of the first flood control

21

Norma Cox, concerned Las Vegas resident and member of the League of Women Voters, interviewed by
author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., June 1, 2010.

24

measures to fail during heavy rains. For nearly a decade after the district was formed the
various public works departments had to play catch-up in order to correct all the poorly
designed flood control systems.22
In 1995 FEMA issued Clark County one flood plain map, which allowed all local
jurisdictions to work under one set of data points for the area. Prior to 2002, with the
advent of the computer-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS), flood data was
kept on paper maps. Even with one flood plan map engineers pieced together hydrologic
studies conducted over hundreds of square miles, which did not take into account specific
topographic features or soil conditions, which affect the hydrology of a region. In
addition, the maps were designed based on different levels of technology over the
decades. After 2002, GIS gave flood control engineers across the nation a repository of
digitally formatted flood maps that could be pieced together to create detailed regional
maps or very specific maps at the neighborhood level. As a result, present-day flood
control engineers can calculate the flow of water once it hits a watershed, allowing them
to better predict the probability of flooding.
By 2002, the CCRFCD had done such an excellent job in advancing Clark
County’s flood control system that FEMA awarded the region the nation’s first digital
map modernization program (DFIRM), which coincides with the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP). By being the first community to work with the DFIRM
system, CCRFCD had the best tools for predicting flood hazards and advising residents in
newly identified flood zones that flood insurance would be required. On the other hand,
more land and existing homes could be removed from flood zones as a result of the high22
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powered computer programs that accurately predict flooding hazards. In less than twentyfive years, with a comprehensive regional flood control plan, Clark County has become
one of the nation’s premier communities in the battle to mitigate flood hazards. However,
this is a far cry from the first eighty years of Las Vegas history. The community
experienced decades of piecemeal flood control measures, jurisdictions not cooperating,
poor oversight of building codes, and near criminal construction practices. The first
efforts to regionalize flood control came in the wake of the June 13, 1955, flood, but the
story of flooding in Southern Nevada goes back to the founding of Las Vegas in 1905. 23
The First 50 years of Las Vegas
In 1974, the Nevada Division of Water Resources and several city and county
entities in Clark County requested that a flood hazard analysis study be prepared covering
Las Vegas Wash and tributaries in the Las Vegas valley. In 1975, under the direction of
the United States Department of Agriculture, the Soil Conservation Service began a study
of the region’s flood history. It based its research upon an assembly of newspaper
accounts starting shortly after Las Vegas’s founding in 1905 - routine climatological
accounts were omitted, and only those articles describing some type of flooding or
resource damage were reviewed and assembled.24
The 1977 report became the de facto resource for flood control officials in the
early 1980s, because there was no data kept on flood events until 1960. The report also
assisted flood control officials in establishing a list of flood-prone areas. Plaintiffs and
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defense lawyers routinely used the report in the late 1980s and early 1990s to determine
liability on the part of developers and public works departments or to prove that flood
hazards existed in a specific area of the valley prior to the city’s formation. Most
importantly, it revealed that the Las Vegas area had consistently experienced flooding
since 1905; indeed, prior to the great flood of 1955 the valley had been hit by seventyeight floods. Most of the stormwater flowed through the outlying desert, periodically
washing out a road or a small section of railroad track. Research has revealed that in 1906
and 1910 Meadow Valley, northeast of Clark County near Pioche, experienced the two
largest floods to ever hit Southern Nevada.25
In late March 1906, a large section of desert in Southern Utah near St. George
down through the Virgin River Gorge and into present day Mesquite, Nevada, was hit by
the heaviest rains seen in the region. The Salt Lake Tribune received reports from railroad
engineers, farmers, and local residents that nearly all the low lands were laid waste by
torrents of rain-water and snow melt. The water destroyed crops, killed live stock,
knocked out telegraph service between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles for days, and
damaged or destroyed over one-hundred miles of railroad track from Acoma to Moapa.
The lack of adequate drainage pipes along tracks in the Meadow Valley forced massive
amounts of flood waters along the raised railroad grade. Reports from early survey teams
noted trees, boulders and debris damaged all the bridges in the valley. Union Pacific
officials estimated the repairs would take over a month to complete, forcing the railroad
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traffic through Las Vegas to be diverted north to Goldfield and then across the southern
Sierra Nevada Mountains and down through the Imperial Valley.26
Unlike later floods in the Meadow Valley and Virgin River, in1906 the population
in the Las Vegas valley was less than one-thousand residents. It can be speculated that the
damage to the railroads negatively impacted the local economy, but during the early years
of the town, the economy was still in its infancy. The city was so small it could not
accommodate the passengers from the north bound trains out of Los Angeles, forcing
many trains to immediately turn back after pulling into the Las Vegas station to replenish
their boiler’s water tanks. The Union Pacific hired 350 men from the valley to assist
nearly a thousand others dispatched from Salt Lake City. The economic impact of the
reconstruction work was offset by the severing of a vital supply line that brought in the
mail, fresh produce, and most importantly Utah cattle. It took repairs crews until late
April 1906 to repair the track.27
Then on January 3, 1910, the largest flood in Southern Nevada history rushed
through the Meadow Valley and down the Virgin River, inundating the communities of
Moapa, Bunkerville and the farm lands situated near present-day Mesquite. One-hundred
miles of Union Pacific railroad track was destroyed between Caliente in southern Lincoln
County, Nevada, to just outside of Moapa. Reports out of Calinete painted a picture of
massive devastation – deposits of mud and silt one-foot deep in nearly every house in the
area. The water and debris flowing out of the high grounds destroyed many farms. With a
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drainage basin as large as the state of Pennsylvania, the narrow Meadow Valley was
unable to carry the relentless floods in the usual channels.28
Robert Graham, editor for the Caliente Prospector, had to secure a local quarterhorse to escape the torrent of rushing water. After many attempts to cross the bloated
Virgin River his horse was swept away in the swirling waters; he escaped with his life,
but had to strike out on foot for nearly sixteen miles to Panaca. During his trek through
the Meadow Valley, he recalled places along the flood’s path where two-feet of water
stood over the tracks for miles, one spot he observed four-feet of ice over the tracks that
had frozen during the frigid high-desert nights. Farther down the valley a train of thirty
rail-cars was completely overrun by the rampaging waters; the crew narrowly escaped to
high ground. For two days they hiked through the hills until they finally reached the small
community of Guelph nearly fifty miles away.29
It took repair crews from Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles over three
weeks to repair or replace thousands of railroad ties and track on the main line. Residents
were displaced for months. From the time the Meadow Valley line opened in 1905 floods
washed out the tracks three separate times. The 1910 flood forced the Union Pacific to
either rebuild or invest millions in relocating the track to higher ground. In the end,
company officials decided to invest millions of dollars to cut out portions of the adjacent
mountains to raise the tracks out of the Meadow Valley.
The 1910 flood knocked out railroad service between Salt Lake and Las Vegas,
diverting the entire railroad traffic bound for Southern California through Goldfield. Even
though the Union Pacific reassured local government officials that the rebuilding efforts

28
29

Las Vegas Age, January 8, 1910 and January 15, 1910
Las Vegas Age, January 8, 1910. Ibid, “Rushing Torrents”

29

for the southern portion of the damaged tracks would be staged in Las Vegas, the town’s
business class became convinced that floods had to be controlled. Business in Las Vegas
grew in the days after the flood, as men and capital flowed into the small community.
There had been a local depression of sorts affecting Las Vegas since the town’s founding
in 1905, but the railroad made Las Vegas the headquarters for the work on the south side
of the 100-mile gap, with all the material staged and the workers housed in the
community. The company pumped thousands of dollars into the local economy every
week.30
Prior to the June 13, 1955, flood, the 1923 storm over downtown caused the worst
damage to the city. Unlike the 1955 event, the damage in 1923 was caused by high
winds, lightening and poorly constructed buildings. During the city’s first fifty years, the
flooding continued to washout railroad tracks, damage communities on the Virgin River
and wash out sections of road on the valley’s periphery that were built to accommodate
the urban expansion. Most flooding in the valley was isolated, affecting only a few homes
or a small section of road, and typically lasted only a short period of time. For example,
the 1938 flood in the southeast part of the valley during intense rainstorms between
February 22 and March 3, virtually cut off Boulder City and Las Vegas. The stormwater
washed out large sections of road and railroad track across the desert. But repairs were
made quickly and little attention was given to the damage in local newspapers. Most of
the water that rushed through the valley during the 1930s and 1940s spared the larger
metropolitan area. For the most part, until the early 1950s downtown Las Vegas and its
suburbs between Charleston Boulevard to the south and Washington Avenue to the north
were protected from massive stormwaters rushing out of the surrounding mountains
30
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because they were situated on high ground and the waters were corralled by the natural
washes. In addition, the outlying washes had not been affected by the sporadic
developments west of downtown and the Union Pacific Railroad tracks. Lastly, roads in
urban core, especially those along the eastern section of the town near the Huntridge
community, were able to withstand the stormwater run-off from storms that occurred
over the city. But the 1955 flood forced Las Vegans to face the consequences of
developing lands in flood-prone areas and assess the benefit of growth and the hazards of
flooding.31

Figure 12. Boulder Highway, March 3, 1938, flood.
Courtesy of UNLV Special Collections

31

Las Vegas Evening Review Journal, March 3, 1938.

31

CHAPTER II
1955-1962
“Homes are built in areas that were historic waterways for previous flashfloods.
In the old days no desert-wise prospector or cattle-raiser would dream of camping in a
dry-wash, especially with the prospect of a flash-flood.”32

Figure 13. Youth diving from a street lamp into the Charleston Boulevard Underpass.
(photo credit to Bill Rogers)
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The Flood of 1955
A tidal wave of water from the Spring Mountains west swept down on Las Vegas
during the afternoon hours of June 13, 1955. Towering storm cells over Red Rock
Canyon and Mt. Charleston produced an inch of rain in less than 45 minutes. The force of
the flood waters created 10-feet deep gulleys on the outskirts of town and knocked out
power to many areas of the community; 70 percent of the residents did not have
telephone service throughout the night and next day.33 The emergency within the city
required that all auxiliary police and off-duty officers be called up for 24-hour service.
Patrolmen abandoned squad cars to direct traffic, stacking fruit crates and boxes to get
above the rushing water. Mercy Ambulance that day managed to get a single ambulance
across the Union Pacific tracks to the west side of the city. Patients in all emergency calls
on that side of the tracks were taken to Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, while calls
on the east side went to Las Vegas Hospital. The floods divided Las Vegas in half at the
railroad tracks because the Charleston and Bonanza underpasses flooded. Built in the
1940s to serve the expanding suburbs southwest of downtown, the Charleston Boulevard
and Bonanza Road underpasses were the city’s primary east-west passageways. Shortly
after the flood waters began rushing through town on June 13, both underpasses filled to
the bottom of the train trestles. 34
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Figure 14. Corner of Main Street and Charleston Boulevard, June 13, 1955.
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections)

Figure 15. Corner of Fremont Street and Charleston Boulevard, June 13, 1955.
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections)

34

Figure 16. Rescue crews in a boat at the Charleston underpass, June 13, 1955.
(image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections)

Figure 17. A fire-engine crew pumping water out of the Bonanza underpass, date
unknown. (image courtesy of UNLV Special Collections)
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Roads resembled rivers and the high water stranded cars. A common sight across
Las Vegas and North Las Vegas during the evening commute on June 13 was motorists
abandoning their cars and striking out on foot. Even though people tried to drive or walk,
many residents were virtually isolated as water backed into yards and homes. Newer
sections of the city suffered complete isolation. For example, residents of the Twin Lakes
area west of downtown faced three to four feet of water runoff. Police would not allow
residents in one northwest neighborhood to return home after work, forcing many to sleep
at the home of a friend or relative. The Review-Journal’s managing editor, John Cahlan,
cut off from his office, relayed damage reports on the west side of town to the newsroom.
Senator Richard Bryan, then a senior in high school, remembered enjoying a summer
date before the intense rain ended the evening. After dropping off his date at her parent’s
Hyde Park home near Valley View Boulevard and Charleston Boulevard, he spent most
of the night driving north and south along the railroad tracks attempting to cross. “I had
to sleep in my car,” Bryan recalled in 2010, “there was no way to cross the tracks
anywhere in the desert and the underpasses were closed.”35
From the time Las Vegas was founded in 1905, residents considered flooding a
nuisance – roads would be damaged, people stranded at work or home, and utilities
affected for hours. Usually, the recorded major storm-events occurred in sparsely
populated rural areas of the Las Vegas valley, the northeast region of Clark County near
Moapa Valley, Bunkerville, or along the Virgin River. Local officials and “old-timers”
considered the June 13, 1955, storm to be the worst in Las Vegas since 1923. The 1923
storm primarily produced lightening and hail damage, while high winds overturned
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poorly constructed buildings. On the other hand, the 1955 damage came from massive
flood waters ripping through properties situated on historic waterways. The flood damage
in the city of Las Vegas surpassed $3 million, one-third of the damages were to private
residents.36
Days after the flooding, the local media began pointing the finger at land
developers and home builders. “In the old days,” observed one Las Vegas Sun writer, “no
desert-wise prospector or cattle-raiser would dream of camping in a dry-wash, especially
with the prospect of a flash-flood.”37 During the city’s expansion in the late 1940s and
1950s, land sub-dividers developed a habit of ignoring nature to build in areas that were
dry arroyos, and city and county commissioners let them. Urban hydrology would not
begin to influence planning in Las Vegas until the late 1960s, but in the arid Southwest,
the land was visibly scarred by previous washes. After the 1955 flood, Las Vegas
officials began emphasizing drainage standards for new developments. Major C.D.
Baker, himself a civil engineer, called for the Las Vegas building permit office to require
that adequate drainage plans be included in subdivision engineering prior to final
approval. Las Vegas planners put a stop to dead-end streets in areas where they identified
drainage issues. Homes on several dead-end streets saw the greatest amount of damage as
flood waters became damned behind the cul-de-sac’s blocked walls. Even with the city
hall outcry, little came from the demands for better drainage and building inspection.
Over the next three decades, as building codes were refined and the valley’s city and
county governments increasingly formalized planning procedures, developers presented
engineered drainage systems for approval. However, once the concrete was dry and the
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homes were built, hardly any neighborhood was inspected to ensure compliance. No
doubt plenty of money changed hands during the process. Evidence of poor compliance
with building codes and lax adherence to engineered drainage systems surfaced after
future floods, creating major life-safety concerns in the valley.38
Once the community dried out in late June 1955, officials reported that no lives
had been lost in the flood waters. Unfortunately, the real tragedy came after the waters
receded and officials began assessing the damage. Six thousand homes, or nearly half the
residents in the Las Vegas valley experienced flood damage. Las Vegas-based insurance
agents estimated that less than $1,000 worth of flood insurance existed in the entire metro
area. Few people living in the arid Southwest during this time cared to pay $250 for a
three-year policy for flood insurance. National flood insurance was not available until the
United States Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968,
and mandatory flood insurance was not required until 1974.39
Prior to the NFIP, massive flood damage relief for affected residents, business and
municipal services came first from local disaster funds and then from federal emergency
declarations. Immediately following the damage reports from the flood, Nevada U.S.
Senator Alan Bible asked a federal emergency team to survey the area for possible
federal assistance. He informed Las Vegas City Manager A.H. Kennedy that a formal
request for emergency disaster relief would be sent to Governor Charles Russell, who
under Public Law 875 would then request President Dwight Eisenhower to declare Las
Vegas an emergency area. This event began thirty years of local and state officials
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reaching-out for federal assistance for rehabilitation and construction of flood control
mitigation projects.
Until the passage of the quarter-cent sales tax increase in Clark County for flood
control in 1986, Southern Nevada experienced a roller-coaster ride in the pursuit of
federal monies for flood control and disaster relief, especially in 1959 when local and
state officials requested funding for Army Corps of Engineers’ studies and construction
projects. The 1970s and early 1980s were fiscally lean years for the Corps, as the Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations redirected flood mitigation funds to pay for
projects with greater political capital, such as the Clean Water Act of 1977 and growing
defense appropriations. Even though in 1986 Clark County voters approved a funding
measure for flood mitigation and prevention through an increase of the county’s sales tax,
1962 was the first time Clark County officials requested the community to vote on
funding a regional flood control system. Voters overwhelmingly rejected the bond
request, which officials and the media both agreed hurt the area during subsequent floods
in the 1970s and 1980s. However, research indicates that the flood control system
designed by the US Corps of Engineers in 1959 would have had disastrous consequences
for the future of the Las Vegas valley, because it would have restricted growth, not
allowing for storms originating in different parts of the valley. Also, it would have lacked
the ability to protect property outside of the system, and would have been expensive to
build and maintain.40
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In 1955, shortly after Governor Russell requested federal emergency funds for the
Las Vegas area, federal officials dispatched members of the Small Business
Administration (SBA) and Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to set up
temporary offices in Las Vegas to assist the community. The FCDA, eventually covered
$400,000 in public property damage claims under the federal disaster relief fund
approved by President Eisenhower. Unfortunately for the community, the relief fund did
little for the 6,000 affected homes. Federal officials advised property owners to seek bank
loans first and told claimants that if their loan applications were rejected, they would be
accepted at the SBA office. Residents, however, had little optimism that support would
come from the SBA, and local officials expressed frustration at the lack of federal
assistance for the $3 million in damages. The Las Vegas Review Journal saw irony in the
Las Vegas flood, portraying it as a replay of the disastrous flood Henderson had
experienced in 1954. Shortly after that event, Henderson Mayor James B. French had
requested federal aid to build flood control projects, conduct engineer studies, and receive
financial support to rebuild. His effort failed, because the Eisenhower administration was
trying to cut domestic spending and reduce the national debt in the wake of World War II
and the growing threat of the Cold War.41
The Great Levee That Nearly Was
After the 1955 flood, Senator Bible demanded that the Army Corps of Engineers
dispatch an emergency response team to Las Vegas to devise a solution to the problem.
Local officials cautioned residents not to view the Corps’ survey as an immediate
solution that would protect their homes, roads, and utilities. Funding the project required
congressional approval, plus flood control studies often took years to complete, due in
41
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part to manual analysis of rain gauge information and the time-consuming process of
drawing by hand topographic maps by hand. The Corps’ engineering team estimated that
it might take five years before a thorough assessment could be submitted to Las Vegas
and Clark County officials. Hank Greenspun, the owner of the Las Vegas Sun, provided
great insight into the funding crisis Southern Nevada would experience over the next
three decades.42 As he noted,
The Army Corps of Engineers which can’t talk back to a senator usually bears
the brunt of these “demands” yet, their budget for such projects as flood control
is slashed unmercifully. This is an ideal subject for making political hay. There
aren’t very many damaging floods. The senator can “demand” until Hell freezes
over, and he knows there isn’t going to be any flood control by the Army Corps
of Engineers until funds are appropriated for it.43
Nearly all Corps projects required that a percentage of the cost be matched by the local or
state government. In 1962, Southern Nevada residents were given the opportunity to vote
on a bond issue to raise $6 million, which would guarantee $25 million in federal monies
that Congress had set aside to fund the projects identified by the Corps to ease Southern
Nevada’s flooding problems. On April 6, 1962, voters rejected the bond by a 2-to-1
margin.
The failure of the bond vote is traced backed to the late 1950s; residents had
become more frustrated by bureaucratic red-tape stretching the repairs to the city’s
damaged system over years rather than months. Local officials had little recourse;
Southern Nevada depended on federal funds to solve the flooding problem. Fortunately,
the community did not experience another major flood in the urban core for the
remainder of the 1950s, which gave the Army Corps of Engineers enough time to
complete an extensive survey of the Las Vegas Wash and tributaries.
42
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In 1959, Colonel C.T. Newton presented the Corps’ recommendations to the
Clark County Commissioners. The plan called for a series of man-made levees and
massive detention basins to surround Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson. The
largest levee, located on the valley’s west side, would have ranged in height from 4 to 20
feet above natural ground surface. It would have been located seven miles west of Las
Vegas, following the same lines as Rainbow Boulevard and parts of Jones Boulevard
today. Originating northwest of town, at what is now the Craig Road and U.S. 95
interchange, the levee system would head south, directing flood waters to a massive 10square-mile detention basin in the area of Jones and Flamingo Road down to Russell
Road. The western levee would protect the city from the floods emanating from alluvial
fans below the Spring Mountains. The Corps’ fifty-year projection of the valley’s
population in 2000 was a conservative 150,000.44 Fortunately, the agency’s plan was
never implemented because the Las Vegas area’s 2007 population surpassed 2 million
people, and the Corps’ 1959 recommendation would have restricted Las Vegas growth
beyond Rainbow Boulevard.
Figure 18 illustrates one of the two recommendations the Corps presented to local
officials. The plan had numerous shortcomings, such as, the city of Henderson would
have been walled off in three directions, much like a Dutch city waiting for the next
storm to threaten its dykes. The master planned community of Green Valley would have
been difficult to build because there were no control measures planned for the massive
Duck Creek and Pitman washes south of the Las Vegas levee, which presently flow
through Green Valley, Whitney Ranch, and the communities north of downtown
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Henderson. Under the Corps’ proposed system the city of North Las Vegas had no
protection. It can be assumed that the engineers in the 1950s did not understand or simply
ignored the hazards of the Upper Las Vegas Wash and the various alluvial fans coming
off the Frenchman Mountain and the Ground Gunnery Ranges north of the metro area.
Ironically, the deadliest storms in the 1970s and early 1980s hit North Las Vegas.
Potentially the worst consequence of the expansive Las Vegas levee would have
been the restriction of growth for the suburbs west of downtown and the communities
planned west of the burgeoning Strip. Looking back, local flood control officials and
developers speculate if homes could have been built west of the levee they would have
only been constructed on high ground above the numerous washes and tributaries. The
vast amount of uninhabitable desert between the homes would have made it nearly
impossible to justify the cost of running utilities and road improvements to these outlying
structures. Home owners would have had difficulty obtaining home insurance -- their
property, the rural road system, and nearby utilities would have been subject to constant
flood damage. No one could have foreseen that Howard Hughes’s purchase of 25,000
acres of land on the western edge of the city in 1952 would someday become the
Summerlin master planned community. But it could not have been built if the Corp’s
levee system had been installed, because it would not have protected the community. In
fact, the Summerlin area was later one of the first priorities the CCRFCD addressed in the
late 1980s. Fortunately, the Red Rock Detention Basin was the first facility built in the
1990s under the CCRFCD’s master plan; it captures the deadly stormwaters that threaten
Summerlin and Spring Valley.45
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Figure 18. US Army Corps of Engineers recommendations for
a flood control system in the Las Vegas valley.
Areas in yellow are the proposed levees, areas in pink are the natural washes46

In addition to the Corps’ 1959 recommendations, that same year state lawmakers
passed Nevada Revised Statue 543 (NRS 543), which outlined the state’s flood control
policies. Primarily due to budgetary constraints, Las Vegas and Clark County officials
did not act on the Corps’ proposed system until May 1961, when the county commission
established the Clark County Flood Control District for the purpose of conducting
hydrologic studies, acquiring land rights-of-ways, developing flood conveyance, and
assisting in planning and zoning of the entire county. Prior to the creation of the first
regional flood control board in 1985, the county commission did not include the other
46
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jurisdictions on the flood control district’s managing board. In the 1960s and 1970s there
was a common power struggle between the City of Las Vegas and county commission.
After 1985, officials from the entire valley’s jurisdiction comprised the district’s board,
and the CCRFCD was independently managed.
Failed Funding for the First Flood Control District
During the summer of 1961 county officials were considering the proposed flood
control system and a funding mechanism when another series of storms hit in August and
September, flooding streets, damaging homes, and triggering power outages. Finally,
after six years of public outcries, Las Vegas and Clark County officials moved toward
definite action. Generating funds for the projects represented the biggest hurdle to
overcome for the county commission and the newly formed flood district.47
Even though the county commission created the flood control district as a
government agency under NRS 543, the commissioners could not agree on the best
funding source for the future construction projects. In the end, officials proposed to sell
bonds. The Corps’ 1959 report estimate the total federal cost of the overall project at
$13.5 million, which would be roughly $64 million in 2010 dollars. The jurisdictions in
the valley would have to contribute nearly $5 million for the first phase of construction,
with an estimated $800,000 in annual new construction and maintenance. In 1962 the
federal government promised to cover $26 million if Clark County could raise $6 million.
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There was little choice. Indeed, Colonel C.T. Newton of the Corps predicted that the
metropolitan area would incur nearly $1 million in annual flood damages through the
1960s and 1970s without a concerted flood control effort.48
The major flaw in the Corps’ flood control plan came from their engineers’
modeling of the area’s potential flood magnitudes. The system they designed used a
hypothetical flood with stormwaters equal to a 400-year flood event; a storm of this
magnitude would generate 7.5 inches of rain in less than six hours over the entire 176
square miles of the 1960s urban area. That was nearly twice the annual rainfall ever
recorded. With volumes of water that great, 70 percent of the developed land in the Las
Vegas valley would be under standing water. It can be argued the Corps’ engineers
modeling would have drastically altered the physical layout of North Las Vegas,
Henderson, and the foothill communities of Summerlin and Spring Valley to the west,
Aliante in the north, and Anthem Seven Hills in Henderson if the Corps’ system had been
built.
Research confirms that growth would not have been totally stopped by a massive
levee system, but Irene Porter, Executive Director for Southern Nevada Home Builders
Association, and former Assistant City Planner for North Las Vegas and a Southern
Nevada resident since 1954, recently noted that the quality of life for those residents
living outside of the protective walls would have been drastically different. Without a
system to slow the flow of water coming off the mountains, the devastation would be
magnified with every new development diverting flood waters through the desert.
Virginia Valentine, former General Manager for the CCRFCD, envisioned that a vast
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area outside of the levee system with neighborhoods dotting the landscape at highpoints,
and barren land subject to flooding would have had extremely high flood insurance
requirements. Prior to the bond vote in April 1962, a small group of Las Vegas engineers
questioned the Corps’ aggressive model 49
On April 6, 1962, a local group of seven independent practicing consultant
engineers issued a public statement in the Las Vegas Sun opposing the Corps’ flood
control plan. The group argued that the huge cost of building and maintaining the
facilities would more than offset the project’s meager benefits to the community. They
calculated that the hypothetical storm the Corps’ engineers used to model the system
produced twice as much rainfall and stormwater as the Las Vegas valley had ever
experienced. The local group also exposed the inherent flaw of using levee systems as a
flood control method in the desert. Levees worked best, they argued when holding back
rising rivers over temporary dams. The group noted that if a high-intensity storm
occurred inside the Las Vegas metropolitan area, the results could be catastrophic.
Ironically, the group concluded that the Henderson phase of the flood control project that
walled off the small town with three massive levees was the best method for protecting
for the residents. They also urged that steps should taken to establish an area-wide flood
control management program that brought together all the jurisdictions in Clark County.
With great foresight they recommended building catchment basins in the foothills of the
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mountains, and operating the district as a regional group made up of qualified
representatives from all Clark County communities.50
If the $6 million bond sale had passed in 1962, the flood control district would
have gained access to $26 million from the federal government to build and maintain a
flood control system. The Las Vegas Sun and Las Vegas Review Journal ran stories
during the days leading up to the April 10th vote claiming county officials were confident
voters would approve the bond issue by a substantial majority. Officials waived
registration requirements for the election; anyone who owned property could vote, the
argument being the bond money would be generated through an increase in property tax.
Labor leaders supported the bond because it meant sustainable construction jobs for
decades to come. The Las Vegas Strip hotels and the Chamber of Commerce backed
flood control to protect the growing tourist industry. A large advertising campaign
involving all news media reinforced the idea that the vote would be the last chance valley
residents would have to receive matching federal funds for flood control projects. Print
ads supporting the bond peppered both local papers with images of the 1955 flood; the ad
banners read, “Don’t Let This Happen Again!” and “April 10, 1962, is one of the most
important days in the history of Southern Nevada.” The day before the vote, Hank
Greenspun editorialized that “The bond election is the first real effort of the community
to help itself.” Unfortunately for the bond supporters, voters rejected the bond issue by
nearly a 2-1 margin resulting in a quarter-century of “patch-work” flood control projects,
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which never protected the valley from millions of dollars in flood damages throughout
the 1970s and 1980s.51
Voters ignored the warnings of the Army Corps. The Review Journal speculated
the lack of specific voting information made available to the general public leading up to
the vote caused its defeat. In addition, it soon became clear that a lot of people simply did
not know if they were eligible to vote. The “property owners only” specification confused
too many people. According to the 1960 census, 127, 016 people were living in Clark
County, but one observer characterized the voter turn-out as “lighter than H20 molecule
to be exact.” The total number of votes cast was 4,677, 1,705 in favor and 2,972 opposed.
One editor applauded the result, claiming voters recognized the extreme burden local
officials had been putting on property owners with road, water, school and airport bonds.
Indeed the Review Journal cited the loaming $6 million bond for the Las Vegas Valley
Water District in November as a factor for a flood control bond going down to defeat. It
demonstrated, the newspaper argued, that Nevadans in 1962 viewed federal matching
funds as “handouts” that in the long run would come from the taxpayers. Clearly, the
conservative tendency of local voters combined with the high-cost of Las Vegas’ growth
defeated the bonds in 1962 and discouraged further flood control initiatives for another
quarter century. Ironically, the bond failure proved beneficial. As this thesis will argue,
the bond’s failure to fund the massive levee and channel system ensured that the rapid
physical expansion of the Las Vegas valley through the 80s, 90s, and the early 2000s
would not be hampered. The Corps’ projects would have drastically affected the area’s
ability to expand, primarily because the Corps’ large levee system designed to protect Las
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Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson in the 1960s would have cut off hundreds of
square miles from being developed properly, as well as not protecting the cities from
future floods that would occur when massive storms soaked the communities inside the
levee system.52
In 1975, one local reporter cynically described the 1962 vote as being affected by
the blue skies on that Election Day, suggesting the shortsighted view the community
generally approached flood control with lacked consideration for their neighbors’
wellbeing. It would be twenty-four years before Clark County residents would have
another opportunity to approve comprehensive funding for a flood control plan. In the
interim, the separate entities: Clark County, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson,
Boulder City, and the outlying areas of the community each had to fend for themselves.
Each did its best to provide flood protection for its constituents, but political firction
between the fractured entities made even the simplest of solution problematic. Through
the late 1960s and 1970s county engineers planned and recommended county-wide
mitigation projects, but with no regulatory power, the local entities did not approve or
enforce many of the measures. As the valley grew, the majority of the time the flood
control district planned around an entity’s specific needs or scrapped the plans entirely. In
addition, local projects lacked reliable, steady sources of funding to plan and construct
sufficient control structures. Many of the problems the Clark County Regional Flood
Control District would encounter in the 1990s came from the 1960s and 1970s “patch
work” projects and the internecine warfare between the various city and county public
works agencies. Improvements were made usually after each major deluge, an approach
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local urban planners characterized as, “rain-flood-fix-improve-wait for next storm.” This
scenario would repeat itself until 1986, when voters finally approved an equitable and
sustainable funding method to build a flood control system through an increase in county
sales tax. After more than three decades, voters finally realized that flooding threatened
Las Vegas’ national image and therefore its continued growth. At the same time, city and
county leaders also recognized the need for a metropolitan solution to the flood threat.
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CHAPTER
R III
1962-19880
“Rain
n, which is beeneficial eveerywhere else, is harmful in Southernn Nevada.
Itt comes seldoom but whenn it does, loook out.
It neverr rains but thhat it floods.
Swirlin
ng, cascadinng waters ravvage a landsscape as effeectively as drrought.”53

Figure 199. Flooded cars
c in the Caaesars Palace parking lot.
The Flaamingo Hiltoon in the bacckground, Juuly 3, 1975.
(Courtesy of ClassicLasVegas.com
m)
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Failure at the Polls
Even before the last votes had been counted on April 10, 1962, city and county
officials knew the voters had rejected the bond request. As Dick Sauser, Las Vegas
Public Works Director, stated in an April 12, 1962, interview, “The issue failed, but a
provision still must be provided.” He suggested digging a protective moat at Rainbow
Boulevard along the Army Corps of Engineers proposed levee system. “The protection,”
Sauer asserted, “must come from our western area.” During that same time, Nevada’s
U.S. Senator Howard Cannon requested that the federal matching funds be advanced to
Clark County without local participation. Unfortunately, by the end of 1962, both
requests failed – Sauer’s recommendation to build the moat lost momentum because
neighborhoods had been under construction west of the Corps’ proposed levee system
even prior to the April vote, plus the community did not experience another flood until
1967. Colonel Boyd Yaden, the consulting engineer for the Army Corps of Engineers,
considered Senator Cannon’s request but inevitably Washington D.C. did not bend on its
requirement that matching local funds had to be secured before any money from the
Corps could be spent.54
Over the next decade, the local flood control offices operated with different
priorities: the City of Las Vegas worried about its expanding border to the west, while
Clark County focused on protecting growth on the Strip. Flood control was typically
under the public works department and always operated with a limited budget provided
by city and county commissioners in response to flood damage. The 1972-1973 budgets
for the county flood control district allotted a scant $35,441. Throughout the 1960s and
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1970s flood control was left to developers; local governments loosely regulated the
“patch-work” system. Clearly, there was no public oversight to prevent construction in
flood-prone areas because in 1966, despite warnings from geologist and the Army Corps
of Engineers, Jay Sarno opened Caesars Palace on the edge of the Flamingo Wash. The
construction contractors paved a portion of the wash that ran through the property to
expand its north parking lot. This would prove to be a costly mistake when a massive
flood on July 3, 1975, ripped down the Flamingo Wash destroying nearly 300
automobiles in the resort’s parking lot. The flood prompted promoters and local officials
to begin worrying about flooding’s impact on Las Vegas’ national image. Also threatened
were newly constructed homes and apartments lining the banks of the Flamingo and
Tropicana Washes east behind today’s Imperial Palace and west of the Strip.
By the mid-1960s the resort economy flourished, pricing downtown residential
lots out of existence and forcing many homeowners to sell to commercial developers.
Families were attracted to the newly emerging suburbs south and east of the city. During
this time the valley saw the first substantial efforts by city and county planning agencies
to bring order to the central city as well as the growing edges of the metro area along
Decatur Road, Tropicana Avenue, Smoke Ranch Road, and east of Boulder Highway.
The water and sanitation districts implemented a bold construction program during the
1960s. In less than a decade, water and sanitation master plans brought a coordinated and
orderly infrastructure to the community’s periphery. These utility connections opened
large areas of land for developers to build in the desert, which allowed isolated
neighborhoods to tie into the growing water and sewage system. But ominously, Clark
County officials did not regard comprehensive flood control as vital to the expanding
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network. Local building and planning departments were merely concerned with flood
control on a neighborhood and property level, approving a developer’s channel and pipes
installation even if it stopped at the end of the property-line and possibly increased the
flooding risks to down-stream communities.
Urban expansion was promoted by the construction of large auto corridors
crossing the entire valley – Tropicana Avenue, Flamingo Road, Desert Inn Road,
Charleston Boulevard and Vegas Drive running east-west. The major north-south routes
were Rainbow Boulevard, Decatur Road, Las Vegas Boulevard (the Strip), Eastern
Boulevard, Lamb/Sandhill Road, and Nellis Boulevard. Local public works departments
kept road construction costs down by designing roads to run over the natural terrain. In a
2010 interview, Paul Christensen, a former Las Vegas City and Clark County
Commissioner, recalled approving Press Lamb, who was the County Supervisor in the
1970s and the main road builder in Southern Nevada, to pave existing dirt roads over the
desert’s natural “hills and dales.” Lamb did a great job of paving roads very quickly in
the valley. Christensen recalled nicknaming new roads “Press Lamb Specials.” This type
of road construction worked well when the town was small; paving over the existing dirt
road and not having to raise it over the natural washes meant the community could open
up large chunks of desert without spending a large amount of local tax dollars.
Unfortunately by the 1980s, this policy of not building bridges or installing drainage
pipes in the larger washes in the periphery made it impossible to travel across town and
almost always caused major road damage during even minor storms. Through the late
1990s, 2000s and into present day, it is a common site during heavy rainfalls to see
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automobiles backed upon either side of a flooded section of road in less populated areas
of the valley that had not been raised over washes (fig 20).55

Figure 20. State Route 159 near Red Rock Conservation Area, December 22, 2010.
(photo credit to Las Vegas Sun)

Into the 1960s, local public works officials had not recognized how stormwater
was affected by urbanization. Finally in 1968, the American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) conducted a national survey of major studies on urban stormwater runoff. The
ASCE concluded that engineers and urban planners should consider the possibility of
modifying land-development and drainage practices to reduce peak flow rates. As the
United States expanded its road network, suburbs mushroomed on the periphery of all
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major metropolitan areas. As more people moved into the arid Southwest, road
construction drastically affected natural stormwater drainage systems. Communities
located in areas of the Sunbelt that experienced intense rain storms such as Riverside,
California, Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Las Vegas had to develop systems for controlling
upstream waters exiting onto a community and potentially impacting downstream places.
During the late 1960s, survey hydrologist Luana Leopold wrote a guide to
hydrology for urban planning. Leopold’s suggestions became the basis for a new concept,
“blue-green development.” In the 1970s the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
coined this phrase. The basic idea was to combine stormwater storage and open space.
Rather than constructing large artificial drainage channels in urbanized areas to divert
water around existing structures, the developer would create natural catchment basins and
ponds in each neighborhood to store it. This practice is also called “stormwater
harvesting.” By the early 1970s, the idea had shaped the development of a number of
projects, from a low-cost subdivision in El Paso to the celebrated “new town” of
Woodland, Texas.56
By the mid-1970s the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forty-two research
facilities across the nation working on stormwater harvesting. The department had two
labs in Arizona, one in Phoenix and another in Tucson. The Phoenix lab designed
systems for individual buildings to capture and bank stormwater, which could be used for
irrigation or waste water conveyance. Today, stormwater banking has become a vital
component for developers pursuing the highest Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) Platinum rating; to be considered, the structure must have a water
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collection system in place. The Tucson lab worked on stormwater harvesting, which is
the practice of capturing water on each development in ponds or artificial lakes. Then in
1972 Congress passed the Clean Water Act, which set targets for pollutants, which
increased the importance of capturing stormwater, as well as commercial and residential
runoff, before it enters natural waterways. Environmental officials argued that the
country’s water system would be permanently affected by man-made pollutants like oil,
grease and pesticides if something was not done. Proponents such as Luna Leopold
stressed that stormwater harvesting in catchment ponds would absorb the pollutants.
However, it is important to understand that harvesting is only successful in areas that
have enough rainfall to recharge the ponds. In the arid Southwest where the basin would
be empty for months on end, it would require communities to recharge the basins with
valuable water. Typically, land values are too high to remove large portions of a new
development for harvesting. By having catchment ponds in Las Vegas the shallow salty
aquifer would also be recharged, causing the water to resurface through the areas natural
springs, and after making its way downstream, negatively affecting the fragile ecosystem
of the Las Vegas Wetlands – an ecosystem that is vital to the natural treatment of waste
water coming out of the valley before entering Lake Mead.57
Another major change to flood water policy came in 1968 when Congress
established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) under the Nation Flood
Insurance Act of 1968. The NFIP is a federal program enabling property owners in
participating communities to purchase insurance subsidized by the government. This was
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a watershed piece of legislation, for areas struggling with flooding. For Las Vegas, it was
difficult to enact appropriate building codes, agree on engineering designs for flood
control systems, punish developers who did not comply with established codes, and most
importantly, provide affordable flood insurance. Until 1968 federal actions related to
flooding were primarily responses to significant events. Local and federal officials used
structural measures to control flooding, such as dams, levees, and channels. Generally,
the only available financial resource to help flood victims was federal disaster assistance
that was hard to get declared and government officials forced communities to navigate a
maze of bureaucratic paperwork.
Despite funding under the Flood Control Act of 1936, which attempted to tackle
the growing threat of flooding along America’s rivers and coastal areas, billions of
dollars were invested in structural flood-control projects in the mid twentieth-century.
Unfortunately, as more flood control structures were built, the losses to life and property
and the amount of assistance to flood disaster victims continued to increase. As early as
the 1950s, federal officials proposed flood insurance, but it was clear that private
insurance companies could not profitably provide such coverage at an affordable rate
because of the catastrophic nature of flood events and the inability to develop actuarial
tables that could reflect the risk of flood-prone areas. In response to the private insurance
companies’ inability to offer cost effective policies, the federal government took over the
insurance program in 1965, first under the Federal Insurance Agency, and then in 1979
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became the permanent managing
agency.58
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The NFIP required communities to follow strict national floodplain management
standards laid out in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. For example, commercial
and residential finished floors had to be 12-inches above an established community’s
100-year flood level; structures in areas prone to river or coastal flooding had to be
constructed with flood-resistant materials, and property dividing-walls had to contain
openings that would permit the automatic entry and exit of floodwaters. The program also
called for the Federal Insurance Agency to map all areas of the country in order to
uncover regional flood risk.59
In December 1968 Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, delegated authority for administering the NFIP to the
Federal Insurance Agency (FIA). That same month the Flood Insurance Rate Study and
Map (FIRM) program began. It required that every community in America be mapped
and rated to create a flood hazard probability. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
agreed to assist FIA in outlining individual floodplain boundaries, using existing
topographic maps and aerial surveys of specific regions. In the same year the Army
Corps of Engineers completed a six-year study that identified 5,000 flood-prone
communities across the nation. There was an immediate recognition that scientific
mapping of the major floodways could not be done within the time frame specified by the
1968 legislation, so the act was amended in December 1969 to authorize an “Emergency
Program,” which allowed for the creation of Flood Hazard Boundary Maps (FHNM) or
“Flat Maps” (fig 21).
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Figure 21. Flat map from Maine.

These maps displayed no topographical features and had little useful information
on them, so it was difficult to determine whether a specific property was within a
floodplain. Through the early 1970s, the federal government offered limited amounts of
insurance to participating communities who were waiting on USGS and FIA to complete
the mapping. By the end of 1973, the FIA estimated there were 13,000 flood-prone
communities.
In 1973 Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act mandating purchase of
flood insurance for all structures within a flood-zone. Congress also prohibited federal
agencies from providing financial assistance in the wake of a flood disaster to any
community that did not participate in NFIP by July 1, 1975. Drastic changes in federal
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regulations forced city and county officials, local builders, and urban planners to
reevaluate their land development policies.60
Another important piece of legislation came in 1973. The NFIP established
floodplain management regulations for Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHAs), which is
land lying within the floodplain of a community. The SFHAs are subject to a 1 percent or
greater chance of flooding in any given year, which is the community’s 100-year flood
equivalent. It was virtually impossible for the USGS team to survey every mile of floodprone land or complete the appropriate studies to determine if a specific area within a
region qualified as a SFHA. Consequently, the original maps provided a broad-based
view of each community’s topographical features and did a poor job of accurately
identifying homes or undeveloped land that sat in a flood-zone, causing a great deal of
confusion for participating communities and their code enforcement departments. Then in
April 1979 the Department of Housing and Urban Development transferred the NFIP
over to the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency. Shortly after taking
over the program, FEMA spent millions of dollars to ensure that the appropriate lands
were under SFHA and remove the ones that lay outside of floodplains.
During this same period local officials and builders were still taking major risks
by continuing the nearly criminal practice of straddling flood plains with little regard to
risk of life and property. It should be noted that the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas
and Henderson were able to participate in the NFIP by 1980. In fact, shortly after the
NFIP applications were given out to communities in 1974, the City of North Las Vegas
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completed the appropriate paperwork and flew Irene Porter, its Assistant Planning
Director, to San Francisco to submit the first application from Southern Nevada.61
It took Clark County until the 1990s to qualify for participation in the NFIP.
Present-day CCRFCD officials speculate the delay in the county’s participation was due
in part to FEMA prioritizing mapping for communities with a higher risk of flooding and
with larger population centers; up through the early 1980s the county was still sparsely
populated. Research suggests that the decades of mismanagement and patch-work
construction of flood control came back to haunt county officials. It took the county’s
public works department and flood control officials nearly fifteen years to improve the
system in order to participate in the program. It can also be concluded that the strict NFIP
building codes, which Clark County officials began enforcing in the early 1980s, allowed
for compact, sustained and rapid growth in the metropolitan area through out the 1990s
and early 2000s.62
By the twenty-first century, CCRFCD’s success in mitigating floods had
propelled Clark County into the forefront of FEMA’s effort to modernize floodplain
mapping in the digital age. In 2002, Clark County was the first community to receive a
Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map (D-FIRM), which provides information for evaluating
flood hazards through computerized modeling as a community’s development evolves
and changes natural floodplains with streets, walls and bulldozes surfaces. This paper
concludes that the pressure of the NFIP and FEMA did not force the cities and county to
reform seventy years of short-sighted flood control, but in fact it can be traced back to the
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community’s response to the massive July 3, 1975, Caesars Palace flood and a 1980
liability lawsuit filed by a local resident, Albert Powers.63
The Caesars Palace Flood
In 1966 Caesars Palace opened with great fanfare and excitement. It was one of
the largest resorts in the world at the time with its Roman-themed interior and majestic
fountains. The property, which is still situated on the northwest corner of Flamingo Road
and the Strip, was built adjacent to the Flamingo Wash. Portions of the north parking lot
dipped through the wash and were used as a flood control channel to divert stormwater
around the property (fig 22). During the resort’s early years when stormwater poured in
from the west, floods covered that part of the lot in the wash, as water flowed under the
Strip and the Flamingo Capri (where the Imperial Palace is presently located), past the
Flamingo Hilton, on its way toward Lake Mead. Caesars’ management posted signs on
light poles warning patrons that the area was subject to flash flooding. Over the years the
maintenance staff painted a yellow line on each side of the wash, running the length of
the property to show the high-water mark. By the mid-1970s the popularity of Caesars
Palace had grown, and more visitors came each year to experience its themed
atmosphere. Many out-of-state tourists as well as local residents parked in the wash,
ignoring the posted warnings of potential flood hazards. Periodically a flash flood would
sweep away a vehicle parked in the wash (fig 23), but for the first ten years of the
property’s operation, patrons avoided parking in the wash.
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Figure 22. Top right of the image shows the north lot and the wash, March 3, 1975.
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau.)
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Figure 23. September 12, 1969 west side of the Strip at the Flamingo Wash
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau)

For a while the lack of floods through the Flamingo Wash created a false sense of safety.
Even the Caesars Palace security staff stopped enforcing the property’s “No Parking” rule
in the wash – so, on July 3, 1975, hundreds of patrons’ cars were parked there.
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Local officials and casino owners were gearing up for a busy Fourth of July
weekend. All the hotels along the Strip and downtown were completely booked. Many
eager visitors arrived in town mid-week to enjoy the entertainment and relax before the
weekend’s big crowds arrived. On Thursday, July 3 there were dark thunder clouds over
the western Spring Mountains, but on the Strip it was sunny and hot. As the storm clouds
grew darker, Caesars Palace security kept in close contact with the metro police, whose
helicopter was surveying the rainfall in the mountains. Shortly before 4 p.m., a Caesars
Palace security guard radioed dispatch with a frantic message that a two to three foot wall
of water was rushing under I-15 toward the property. The brown, debris filled water
slammed into hundreds of cars parked in the restricted area of Caesars Palace’s north lot.
Along the way, this torrent of water had collected trees, brush, man-made garbage that
had been dumped in the desert, as well as large amounts of soil and rocks.
The force of the rampaging water lifted cars off the ground, literally creating
hundreds of boats. Seconds after the river of stormwater invaded the lot, cars and debris
lodged up against the drainage culvert under the Strip. The combination of cars, debris
and the angled culvert supports, caused the water to pond and eventually to overflow onto
the Strip. Fortunately for Caesars Palace, The Flamingo Hilton and the Holiday Inn
(which is now the Harrah’s Las Vegas), the flood waters crested just inches from each
resort’s front entrance. It should also be noted that the Imperial Palace, which would have
sat directly in the floods path, had not yet been built.64
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Figure 24. July 3, 1975 Clark County Public Works situated a crane on the Strip
to remove cars.
(Image courtesy of the Las Vegas News Bureau)

Shortly after the stormwater subsided, emergency crews mobilized and worked
with Clark County public works staff to bring in a large crane that removed cars stuck in
the drainage culvert. Crews worked through the night and into the Fourth of July lifting
more than 200 cars out of the wash and Caesars’ parking lot. Numerous insurance firms
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set up temporary offices in Caesars to process claims over the weekend. Ironically, the
clean up on the Strip was hampered by hundreds of tourist and curious sightseers who
swarmed into the area to watch the cleanup efforts, taking pictures and wading through
the muddy sidewalks. Extra police had to be called in to control the crowds.

Figure 25. July 4, 1975, view from Caesars Palace of the massive clean up effort.
Image courtesy of the CCRFCD
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This was the first major Las Vegas flood to make national news. Indeed, as
former Chairman of the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority and former Clark
County Commissioner, Jay Bingham recalled in a 2010 interview, the Caesars Palace
flood was the first time a Southern Nevada natural disaster had ever made national news.
Also in 2010, Senator Richard Bryan remembered receiving calls from all over the
country from friends and family fearing for his family’s safety. “They must be crazy,” he
thought that day; “It had not rained a drop near my downtown office.” People in other
parts of the Untied States saw images of the Caesar Palace parking lot flooding and
assumed the entire city was underwater, when in fact the storm that produced the flood
waters was more than five miles west of the Strip.65
For people living outside of the arid Southwest, flooding typically occurs when a
swollen river crests its banks or a levee breaches. As discussed in chapter one, riverine
flooding, most commonly resulted from long sustained rainfall or when large amounts of
snow melt enter an area’s watershed system, or from massive hurricanes. For decades,
images have peppered newspapers or been captured on the national evening news
programs of residents working to create man-made levees of sandbags along a swollen
river in an effort to protect homes and businesses from flooding, or costal residents
fleeing days or maybe hours before a hurricane made land-fall. The common thread
between all these types of floods is time. Riverine flooding is typically slow, sometimes
taking days or weeks to reach flood status.
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Unlike riverine flooding, the rain storms that cause flooding in the arid Southwest
are very intense, short, isolated thunderstorms. After the 1975 Caesars Palace flood, it
became apparent to the local leaders that a localized flood event could be taken out of
context and magnified by the national media to the long-term detriment of Las Vegas’s
tourist industry. The rest of the nation lacked experience with these types of storms.
People did not understand that a flood could be raging in one part of the valley, while less
than a mile away, the land could be completely dry and its residents oblivious to the
destruction going on. By the late 1970s, local officials, casino owners, and city promoters
become more aware of the nation’s negative perception of Las Vegas during rain storms.
It became apparent by the early 1980s that tourism was being threatened and even hurt
especially in summer by the community’s lack of flood control. Cancellation of room
reservations spiked in the wake of every major flood event in the Las Vegas valley.
Resort owners like Ralph Engelstad of the Imperial Palace and Jay Sarno at Caesars
Palace pressured the Clark County Commissioners to address the flooding problem to the
west of the Strip. The Caesars Palace flood also marked a turning point in the way
Southern Nevadans viewed human interaction with flood waters.66
The deaths of two North Las Vegas traffic engineers only reinforced the
community’s resolve to fix the flood problem. Shortly after the stormwater entered the
Caesars Palace parking lot, North Las Vegas officials dispatched road workers ahead of
the storm. Crews were attempting to barricade low lying roads and wash crossings to
keep people out of danger. Mike Williams and Richard Hunkins were working two miles
west of I-15, near the intersection of Craig Road and Losee Road, putting up road blocks
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at the Upper Las Vegas Wash crossing. By the time the storm reached North Las Vegas,
Irene Porter and Dewayne Sudwick, the city’s Public Works Director, were in a
helicopter surveying the rainfall over the French Mountains north of the city. Porter
recalled in 2010, observing a large sheet flood, which was “a couple of feet deep and very
wide,” flowing from the mountains at a high velocity. “Dewayne and I got on the radio,”
she remembered, “advising all city employees to get out of the area near the Upper Las
Vegas Wash.” Porter received the all-clear signal over her 2-way radio just prior to the
flood waters channeling into the natural washes and existing flood channels. It was later
discovered that Williams and Hunkins crossed back over the wash at Craig and Lossee to
retrieve road barriers they feared would be swept away. When they attempted to return,
the rising waters had enough force to sweep their truck down the wash. Observers
reported seeing one of the men climb out of a side-window and scramble onto the truck’s
roof. The water’s force combined with the buoyancy of the tires rolled the truck over.
The next day members of the Clark County Coroner’s office located both men’s bodies a
few miles downstream from where they were last seen.67
The deaths of Williams and Hunkins and the hundreds of wrecked cars illegally
parked in the wash at Caesars Palace raised major questions about personal accountability
when it came to human interaction with flood waters. Research shows that poor human
judgment caused the sixty-seven flood-related deaths recorded from 1960 to 2007 and the
countless swift water rescues conducted during Las Vegas’s history. Clearly, the loss of
life was a result of flooding is troubling, but people driving into waters, parking cars in
posted flash flood zones, or playing in washes raised the question in the minds of some
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about whether these people could be called “flood victims.” By the 1990s local officials
began to consider those who entered flood waters as foolish and irresponsible. Some
officials even threatened to fine people who willingly entered flooded areas and required
emergency services. Since 1986, the CCRFCD has spent thousands of dollars on
educational out-reach and public service campaigns in the hopes that people will think
twice before entering flood waters.
But in 1975 it was the governments in the metropolitan area that most people
considered foolish and irresponsible for their lack of flood control planning. It was
shortly after the 1975 flood when Albert Powers, a private home owner in the southeast
part of Las Vegas, filed a lawsuit in the Clark County District Court that would become
the watershed case for establishing flood damage liability. The prosecution claimed Clark
County officials had not taken reasonable care to avoid flooding of existing homes in the
southeast part of the valley. The lawsuit also claimed the county was guilty of approving
new private developments at the cost of existing property owners. This case went all the
way to the Nevada Supreme Court in 1980. For the first time in the valley’s eighty-year
history, government entities were held liable for flooding caused by development. The
impact of the Supreme Court’s decision hastened the local governments’ efforts to
develop a comprehensive flood control solution, because flood waters do not respect
political boundaries. In the 1980s and 1990s, more than 1,000 lawsuits were filed;
claiming developers, engineers and local public works departments did not design or
build adequate facilities to protect existing properties.68
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County of Clark v. Powers
During the late 1950s and early 1960s Powers had purchased various properties in
Clark County and developed those properties for residential use. One parcel of land was
near the present-day corner of Desert Inn Road and Eastern Avenue, just east of the Las
Vegas International Golf Course and the country club community on the course. The
development was integrated into the County’s master drainage plan for the southeast part
of the valley. In 1980 the District Court found Clark County guilty, by its own planning,
designing, engineering, and construction activities, as well as its adoption of the plans of
private developers that altered the natural washes and streams west of the Powers’
property. The County filled, leveled, graded, compacted, and paved many areas near the
intersection of Desert Inn and Topaz Road, northeast of the Powers and Lawrence Lowe
Properties to accommodate new homes and commercial buildings along Desert Inn. Prior
to these reconstruction efforts, the curb and gutter system along Desert Inn was designed
specifically to divert and channel stormwater and direct its flow east toward the Flamingo
Wash, which crossed Desert Inn a mile and a half east of the Topaz intersection.69
Once the redesign of the Desert Inn and Topaz intersection was completed in late
1967, the land and road were four feet above the Powers and Lowe’s property lines. The
county installed rock-lined culverts to divert water from a newly constructed grocery
store north of the two properties. The water was channeled to a county maintained
drainage pipe that collected water in various culverts and discharged it onto Powers and
Lowe’s parcels. To make matters worse, the county entered both properties, without
permission, and built a concrete and rock berm to keep stormwaters from exiting their
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properties. The cumulative effort of the County’s construction activities increased and
accelerated the flow of water through the natural stream located near their homes. The
water that was previously draining down Desert Inn to the Flamingo Wash had now been
diverted by county engineers into the small stream system.70
During the 1975 Caesars Palace flood and continuing through the early part of
1976, the parcels were deluged by constant flowing water. Subsequently in 1976, the
county installed a large drainpipe west of the properties, which increased flooding of
homes around Powers. In 1977, attorney Brent Leavitt of Las Vegas filed a lawsuit in
District Court on behalf of Albert Powers, Lawrence Lowe, Rufus Wallace, George
Rodrigues and Joseph Rodrigues. The suit was based on the theory of inverse
condemnation, which is defined as an action brought by a property owner for
compensation from a government entity that has taken the owner’s property without
bringing formal condemnation proceedings.71 Leavitt argued the county should have
provided just compensation through the law of eminent domain if it had desired to
incorporate his land into its flood control system. After twelve days of testimony, District
Court Judge Howard W. Babcock found that the county had taken Powers and the other
plaintiff’s parcels in their entirety. In effect, Babcock ruled that the properties no longer
had a practical use other than as a flood channel. The county appealed, claiming it had
always been immune from liability for damages caused by urbanization. But in a
landmark 1980 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the government entities,
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developers, and engineers had to take into account the full cost of development to the
entire community prior to construction.72
The District Court and Supreme Court agreed that Clark County, as well as the
other local governments, had to take careful consideration of each of the public and
private land users. As Supreme Court Chief Justice John Mowbray stated, “Growth and
urbanization are not unduly restricted, but merely tempered with elements of order,
planning and reasonableness.”73 His opinion on the tempering of growth with order and
planning would become the key principle guiding Las Vegas metropolitan’s rapid
expansion from the late 1980s to today. County of Clark v. Powers also forced local
planning agencies to reassess the flood control system in the Las Vegas valley or face the
possibility of future lawsuits in the wake of flooding. Gone were the days of simply
approving drainage plans for individual homes and neighborhoods on good-faith
agreements between developers and local building permit departments. After 1980,
planning personnel had to ensure that the existing community would not be adversely
affected by future growth. Without a comprehensive flood control plan to correct decades
of mistakes, local governments ran the risk of carrying the liability for the poor decision
of previous public works employees and elected officials. Research shows that the Las
Vegas valley was only able to grow in an orderly manner, because after 1980 officials
started correcting existing flood control problems and held developers to a higher
standard for new construction.
For the Las Vegas valley to become one of the fastest-growing communities in
the United States during the last two decades of the twentieth century there had to be a
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comprehensive flood control plan approved by the metropolitan area’s five government
entities. History proved that with each entity working independent of the others, it would
have been virtually impossible to complete a regional system to convey water through the
valley. There was no framework in place to design a system, prioritize projects, and more
importantly, fund the construction of the facilities. Looking back, politicians, developers,
casino executives, and long time residents all agree that flooding was the catalyst that
helped unify the five local governments. These entities had to come together under a
regional umbrella in order to tackle the flood issue. Aside from solving the flood control
problem in the region, many considered the creation of the Clark County Regional Flood
Control District in 1985 as the first major step toward the City of Las Vegas and Clark
County working together to assist the metro area’s growth.74 In the 1990s the regional
approach of the CCRFCD produced a working model for other special service districts
such as education, police, libraries, and water. It was the first district to adopt a master
plan to address current issues while developing a systematic approach for the future
expansion of Clark County’s urban networks.75 It was also the first district to use a
citizen’s advisory committee to monitor funding allocations as well as being a
community outreach group to promote the vital need for a regional flood control
district.76
In the summer of 1981 there was no flood district and no clear plan for solving
eighty years of mistakes and negligence. Then on August 12, 1981, the communities of
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Moapa and Overton, northeast of the Las Vegas, were nearly destroyed by a series of
storms that produced flood waters equivalent to a 500-year flood event. From 1981 to
1986, central Clark County was hit by massive flooding every summer. Unlike previous
floods, no community was spared during this devastating period. Research has traced the
support for regional flood control back to the storms of 1981-1985; each summer more
people died and the property damages were greater each year. It would take Clark County
Commissioner Bruce Woodbury and Nevada State Assemblyman Jim McGaughey to
design the CCRFCD in 1985 and then, a concerted effort by a small but highly effective
group of dedicated residents, developers, government employees and politicians to
convince Clark County voters to approve a funding mechanism for flood control in 1986.
The dedication of the group Woodbury and McGaughey assembled in 1985 helped
protect lives and property. In addition, their efforts permanently reshaped the physical
landscape of the Las Vegas valley over the next two decades.
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CHAPTER IV
1981-1985
“United we stand, divide we drown.”77

Figure 26. Las Vegas August 11, 1983
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)
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The Endless Summers of Storms
The catalyst that finally moved the Las Vegas valley’s leaders and voters to unite
behind the creation of a valley-wide flood control district were a series of disastrous
floods that hammered the area between 1981 and 1986. Following Robert Broadbent’s
1981 decision to leave the Clark County Commission and become head of the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Republican Governor Robert List appointed fellow Republican
lawyer Bruce Woodbury to replace him.
During the summer of 1981, Woodbury’s district was hit hard by massive
flooding. On August 10, 1981, the communities of Overton and Moapa experienced a
flood several times larger than the statistical 100-year flood flow rates for that region of
the county. The summer storms caused thousands of dollars in property damage, killed
hundreds of cattle, and washed out miles of railroad track along the Lake Mead Branch of
the Union Pacific line. Woodbury noted in a 2009 interview that flooding become his
primary focus after he surveyed the devastation. Over the next two years he attempted to
gain support for flood control in the state assembly, but failed. That summer and into
1984, massive flooding across Southern Nevada finally forced legislators to address the
concerns raised by Woodbury and others.78
During this time local courts began seeing a growing number of flood-related
lawsuits. Even prior to the 1980 Nevada Supreme Court decision in favor of Albert
Powers, victims of the 1975 Caesars Palace flood were still in the courts trying to
negotiate proper settlements. In 1978 the local insurance defense firm of Crommer,
Barker and Michelson, the primary firm representing Clark County, handled more than a
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hundred lawsuits following the June 3, 1975, flood. In 1978 the firm hired Michael
Mansfield, a young lawyer, to take over the mountain of depositions and evidence
collected during the period since the flood. From 1978 through the early 2000s,
Mansfield was the de facto flood defense expert in Southern Nevada. He spent much of
the first decade across the aisle from Brent Leavitt – the lawyer who won the County of
Clark v. Powers case and became known as the “the muddy-water attorney.”79
Looking back, both Mansfield and Leavitt in recent interviews agreed that the
flood problem that Clark County faced the 1980s was magnified by poor government
oversight in the cities and county planning and building permit departments. Even though
in 1981 Bruce Woodbury blamed the Union Pacific Railroad’s poor drainage system for
the massive damage in Moapa and Overton, and even though the local media, flood
control personnel, and officials for years attributed flood damage to poor engineering and
developers continually ignoring building codes, this thesis argues that the building
standards the cities and county attempted to enforce were ineffective and never addressed
the fundamental issues of storm water conveyance and its effect on the surrounding built
environment.
After voters rejected the1962 bonding initiative to fund a regional flood control
district, county commissioners established a flood water management division within the
public works department. In 1979 the small division had two people reviewing and
approving all drainage studies for the entire county. In the mid-1970s Lou Vita retired
from the Los Angeles Water District and moved to Las Vegas to escape the growing
congestion of Southern California. In 1979, Vita decided to get a part-time job to pass the
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time, so he applied for a low-level position in public works. His resume quickly caught
the attention of the department’s director Floyd Lamb. Impressed by Vita’s experience
Lamb offered him a full-time position to run the flood water management division. Vita
was accustomed to large budgets; in the 1970s the Los Angeles Water District was the
premier water management agency in the West, and arguably in the entire United States.
He began with no staff, so realized that he faced a virtually impossible task of managing
the county’s flood control problems.80
Following the 1981 floods in Moapa, residents near the Cooper Avenue crossing
sued Clark County, claiming the bridge and drainage pipes over the dry river bed of the
Muddy River were inadequate to handle stormwater and debris. Prior to the bridge’s
construction, most rain storms would have produced enough water to wash out Cooper
Avenue where the road dipped into the Muddy River wash, cutting off half the town.
Ironically, in late 1980 Floyd Lamb had sent the newly-hired Vita to evaluate various
drainage systems and flood-prone areas his department classified as “hot-spots” that
required immediate attention. The Cooper Avenue crossing was one of the most urgent.
During the first deposition of the 1981 lawsuits, attorney Mike Mansfield called Vita as
an expert witness for the defense. He asked Vita to assess the Cooper Avenue crossing. In
a 2010 interview, Mansfield jokingly recalled the horror that he felt when Vita answered:
“Oh my (explicative)! How could they have built such a thing?”81 Later it would be
revealed that the county’s engineers had designed an all-weather crossing with two large
drainage pipes to be installed and then the road built over top. However, the project lost
funding, but Lamb knew the road needed improvement. So, county public works crews
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constructed a smaller system that was primarily used when water was constantly present.
At the Cooper Avenue crossing, construction crews guessed what the expected flow
direction would be and angled the small culverts accordingly. But when later flood waters
combined with the massive debris field hit the angled culver it instantly clogged and
flooded nearly all the homes in the area.82
Clark County was later found liable for the damages caused in the Cooper Avenue
crossing flood. A growing number of lawsuits against the county and other municipalities
were being processed in district court as a result of the local public works departments
installing less expensive and less adequate flood control facilities to save on cost. Even
though many of the lawsuits were settled out of court, the practice of stretching flood
control dollars for decades was finally coming back to haunt the entire metro area. With
more urgent concerns facing western cities in the 1960s and 1970s, such as traffic, crime,
growth and water, skimping on flood control was a common practice. In Clark County,
planners and developers continued to use urban streets for channeling stormwater to
avoid building concrete lined conveyance channels. With no sustainable funding source,
local engineers and officials during this period did their best to control localized flooding.
Unfortunately, the solutions they were proposing and approving for construction were
inadequate, and in most instances caused even more damage during heavy rain-storms.
By 1981 the flood water management division required developers to prove their
projects were safe from flooding by submitting engineering studies and verbally
confirming that measures were in place to ensure that downstream properties were safe
from exiting stormwater. However, the drainage study that engineers routinely submitted
to Vita’s office was only a single-page that answered just three questions: “How much
82

Ibid.

83

water comes into the development?”, How much water does the development
contribute?” and “How much water leaves the development.” The current CCRFCD
drainage design manual is nearly 600-pages.
Prior to the County of Clark v. Powers case the various building permit
departments in the metropolitan area would stamp or sign-off that a developer’s engineer
had submitted a drainage study, which would protect the government entities from any
liability. Even though defense attorneys argued that the Supreme Court’s opinion was
vague, Mansfield advised Clark County that merely approving a drainage study or
signing off on a retaining wall did not indemnify them. It was later revealed that
developers were getting around code enforcement by simply asking Lou Vita to verbally
approve revisions to flood control standards. “If the county got sued after a flood,”
Mansfield noted in 2010, “the developer would turn on Vita, claiming to the judge that it
was what his office told them to do.” Into the early 1980s the cities and county were
forced to pay thousands of dollars in damages because their approval policies and
oversight did not have checks in place to hold unscrupulous developers accountable.83
Research indicates that the increasing number of flood-related lawsuits in the
early 1990s became a major driving force to ramp up flood control measures, because
many residents believed that corrective actions were taking too long to implement. In
addition, the region was expanding into areas of the desert prone to flooding. However, in
Clark County from 1977 to 1984 there is no evidence that the lawsuits against the local
governments influenced progressive-minded officials like County Commissioners Bruce
Woodbury and Manuel “Manny” Cortez and State Assemblymen Jim McGaughey to
aggressively pursue the formation of a regional flood control plan. For these individuals it
83

Ibid.

84

was about quality of life, a quality of life that was endangered during the summer of
1984.
On August 15, 1984, Urban Livengood, the liaison between Comprehensive
Planning and the Public Works Department testified in front of a Clark County
Commissioners meeting that the cities and county in the past had been waiving flood
control improvements after developers requested financial relief from the strain of rising
building costs. The largest complaint from developers during this period was the unfair
apportionment of flood control cost. In a 2010 interview, Robert Lewis, local land
developer and former home builder, noted that local governments would use “the law of
the jungle,” lumping the entire cost of mitigation projects in a specific area on the first
few builders. Therefore, it was no surprise that developers would skimp on channels and
drainage pipes to keep their costs down, because they felt that flood codes unfairly
inflated construction costs and lowered their overall profit margin, which slowed the pace
of growth.84
Growth in the Las Vegas valley was becoming a problem by the early 1980s. Not
only did more people and a larger area have to be protected, but new developments were
straining existing flood control facilities. This became apparent to some members in the
community after the August 10, 1983, storm, which dropped four inches of rain over the
southwest part of the valley, causing $3 million in damage. Bruce Woodbury attempted
to use this flood to convince state lawmakers of the need to create a flood control district.
Most long-time residents knew that it periodically flooded in Southern Nevada – the
storms hit very hard and very fast, hours later clouds were gone, the sun shined bright,
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and the community cleaned up the dirt and debris. Unfortunately, 1984 would be a
watershed year in the history of flooding for the Las Vegas area.85
From July to September in 1984 seven massive storms hit central Clark County.
The public property damage from flooding exceeded $9 million. During this time the Las
Vegas Review Journal and Las Vegas Sun printed pictures of flooding across the county
that documented the damaged homes, flooded commercial districts, and loss of life. One
of the most dramatic images captured, was that of Don Collett, editor of the Las Vegas
City Magazine and parent, carrying a young North Las Vegas student to safety, through
knee-high waters, with a school bus on its side in the background (fig 27).

Figure 27. Don Collett carrying a North Las Vegas student to safety
(Las Vegas Review Journal August 15, 1984)

85

Las Vegan City Magazine, August-September 1987 issue, 13. “Flood History” Las Vegas Review
Journal, August 20, 2003.

86

President Ronald Reagan declared Clark County a federal disaster area after a series of
deadly storms in September. The powerful images captured by the media of the battered
metro area convinced even the most fiscally conservative resident in the valley to vote for
flood bonds in order to protect local children. During one particular storm on the evening
of September 10, 1984, a young family of five drowned in the southwest part of the
valley. This tragedy became the tipping point for Republican State Assemblyman Jim
McGaughey to pursue a comprehensive flood control solution for Clark County.
McGaughey should be given most of the credit for being the architect of the district,
removing flood control from county control, making it independent, and creating a
Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) to oversee the politicians and ensure the district’s
longevity.86
During the afternoon of September 10, 1984, Frank Faylor of the National
Weather Service in Las Vegas reported a massive storm cell gaining strength over the
Mojave Desert. It was 150 miles long, stretching from Needles, California, across the Las
Vegas valley and up into Lincoln and Nye County. This storm produced an intense
isolated cloud burst; at one point during the day officials observed rain falling on one side
of street in a valley neighborhood while the other side was completely dry. The heaviest
rains hit the Spring Mountains shortly before nightfall. There were reports of a four-foot
deep torrent of stormwater flowing along the Blue Diamond Road just east of today’s
Mountain’s Edge. Around 7:30p.m. Michael Shepard and his wife Carol, who lived in a
remote desert community one mile south of Blue Diamond Road and seven-miles west of
I-15, loaded their three children: Shanna, 6; Shad 3; and Shiela, 2 weeks old, into the
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family truck and ventured out across one of the muddy desert roads near their home.
Metro police later reported that Shepard attempted to gain access to Blue Diamond Road
by driving through the rising flood water, when his truck was swept away. The local
Flight for Life helicopter arrived shortly before 8:00, but came back empty as rescue
officials pronounced all family members dead at the scene. The shocking news was
quickly relayed over the local radio stations. Emergency personnel quickly located four
of the bodies – however, 2-week-old Shiela’s body was not immediately found.87
As the storm intensified, Assemblyman McGaughey raced from his home south of
Blue Diamond Road to assist a group of residents filling sand bags on the banks of the
Duck Creek Wash near Blue Diamond and the I-15. As the evening went on, updates of
the drowning continued to broadcast. The search for Sheila intensified late into the night.
Then around midnight, Ron Flood, who would later become the Clark County Coroner,
pulled Sheila’s body out of a large sagebrush. In a 2010 interview, McGaughey said he
was haunted for years of the image of her little body lodged in those bushes. “That baby’s
drowning was the defining moment,” he proclaimed, “her death gave me the passion to
solve this [flooding] problem.” By late fall he began reviewing options for a bill to
submit in the 1985 Nevada State Legislative session.88
The 1984 floods also captured the attention of Mrs. M.J. Harvey, a local resident
living in a neighborhood on the banks of the Duck Creek Wash near the intersection of
Pecos and Warm Springs just west of the new Green Valley community. Harvey, a
staunch conservative, became involved with flooding after her neighborhood was hit five
times during the summer of 1984. “When it would flood,” Harvey noted in 2010, “I
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would call Bruce Woodbury and he would come out and survey the scene.” By early
1985 the Republican Woodbury, had gained much credibility with the largely
conservative local population. He was known for being a strict opponent of tax increases,
but he recognized that the key to solving the region’s flood threat required hundreds of
millions of dollars for new projects to correct decades of inadequate, patch-work
measures. Voters had approved flood control bonds in 1981 and early 1984, which
yielded $47 million in funds for mitigation projects. However, two problems arose from
the bond issues: bonds do not generate additional revenue for sustaining decades of
construction and maintenance and second, developers continued to construct flood
control across the county that did not link up to downstream projects and channels. In
effect, structures located in one jurisdiction did not match those constructed in a nearby
one. In short, effective flood control required coordinated engineering with the channels
and diameter of pipes widening as the system approached Boulder Highway, through the
Las Vegas Wash and then off to Lake Mead. To complicate matters further, priority was
still given to projects based on past disasters, rather than being part of a more
comprehensive plan to prevent future flooding.89
The Fathers of Flood Control
Unlike Woodbury’s 1983 failure to gain support in Carson City for the formation
of a regional flood control district, by 1985 he had enough political capital to pursue
regionalizing flood control. While city and county planners were enforcing adequate
floodplain ordinances and building codes based on the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) standards, local public works departments still did not coordinate with one
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another to ensure channel systems connected across the valley. Despite prodding by
influential Nevada Resort Association members, local government officials, and private
developers, the county still lacked a comprehensive regional approach. Flood control
exposed the Las Vegas metropolitan area’s core problem: lack of regional government.90
On August 6, 1984, the Clark County Commission working through the Regional
Transportation Commission (RTC) discussed conducting a valley-wide stormwater
drainage inventory to evaluate existing problem areas and develop a short-term needs
survey with cost estimates and funding options. Many different funding sources were
discussed, but a service charge on home owners had the potential of being flexible to
generate sufficient money to establish a viable foundation for the proposed program. The
average property owner would be charged $1.40 per month, which county officials
estimated would generate $25 million in revenue over a ten-year period. In the
commissioners’ defense, the actual master plan’s cost of nearly $1 billion would not be
obvious until late 1985. At this point, Commissioner Manny Cortez and Las Vegas
Mayor Ron Lurie questioned if the RTC would require legislative changes to become
legally responsibility for flood control. There was no language in NRS-543, the state’s
flood control policy, which prohibited the RTC from managing flood control. However,
by mid-fall the board members dropped the idea in support of a new district controlled by
the county.91
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In October members of the RTC unanimously voted to have Clark County ask the
state legislature for bill to enable the county to draft a ballot question for approval in the
1986 general election. Many members of the RTC as well as various local authorities
believed flood control should be managed by the Clark County Commission. Cortez told
local reporters that local and state oversight officials were unnecessarily complicating the
procedure which made Clark County the governing head of the proposed flood control
district. As in the past, officials could not come to a consensus on a funding source; there
were proponents for property tax, special service fees and even a pro-rated utility fee.92
After the summer torrents of 1984, flood control became an election issue, with
every candidate jumping on the band-wagon. In November 1984 voters in the valley’s
eastern section elected Jay Bingham, a strong proponent of flood control, to County
Commission District B. Bingham defeated incumbent Paul May Jr., who had been
appointed by Governor Richard Bryan in 1983 after Commissioner Jack Petitti was
indicted for taking bribes in one of Nevada’s biggest public corruption cases.93 Residents
were tired of politicians like Petitti and May allowing contractors hired to install flood
control measures taking months and even years to complete projects, which threatened
major thoroughfares such as Nellis Boulevard. During his campaign Bingham, who was a
successful valley land developer, saw contractors working for a few days on the roads or
channels before leaving the site to work on the side for a private developer’s project.
Since there were no time limits for public projects, the contractor could move crews over
to the higher-profit private jobs, complete them, and then return to work on flood
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channels or roads. Bingham is credited with establishing completion dates for all public
works projects sent out to bid and for accessing fines and penalties on those missing
deadlines.94
In late 1984 newly elected State Assemblyman Jim McGaughey seized the
opportunity to take a comprehensive flood control bill to Carson City. Over the winter he
assembled a team to draft a bill he could sponsor. The group included Las Vegas City
Manager Ashley Hall, Irene Porter, who left the City of North Las Vegas’s planning
department in 1977 to head the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, and Pat
Shalmy, the director of the county’s public works department and a future Clark County
manager. McGaughey saw the importance of reaching across the deep political divide.
Going against the advice of fellow senior Republican assemblymen, he asked Democratic
State Assemblyman Danny Thompson, chair of the Government Affairs Committee and
the president of the Nevada Steelworkers Union, to be his co-sponsor. McGaughey knew
Thomas was a major proponent of flood control for Clark County and was influential in
the state’s Democratic house minority. It should be noted that the Democrats controlled
the state’s assembly in 1981 and 1983 regular legislative sessions, and then the
Republicans took control in 1985.95
McGauhey’s team argued that a major differentiating factor of the flood control
problem versus other pressing problems, such as the need for more firefighters, police
and schools, was that when floods rushed through the valley, the water ignored political
boundaries. McGaughey understood that each entity had different flood concerns; and,
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therefore, they never came together to share engineering or funding ideas from the top of
Mt. Charleston to the Las Vegas Wash. For example, Thompson expressed his dismay
over a 1980 flood on the western edge of the Henderson city limits, which was caused by
a county approved flood channel that stopped at the edge of the city’s boundary and was
pointed directly at a housing subdivision just a few hundred feet downstream.96
McGaughey noted in 2010 that leading up to his election to the assembly in 1984
he was shocked by the wasteful spending at both the local and state levels. “They always
had the tax payer to fall back on.” As a fiscal conservative, he understood the importance
of designing a bill with a simple but very specific oversight component. By February
1985 McGaughey was ready to propose a sustainable funding mechanism to influence the
metropolitan flood control. It consisted of charging a utility fee whose cost to each
property owner would depend on the amount of water runoff’s effect on that type of
property. McGaughey’s bill also had two additional components: first it outlined the
governing board’s structure and then created two advisory committees to oversee the
projects and funding.97
To fund the preparation of the region’s master construction plan the legislature
also approved a two-percent property tax increase in Clark County for one year to raise
$1.5 million. In late March of 1985, the newly formed Clark County Flood Control
District selected James M. Montgomery Consulting Engineers, a Salt Lake City-based
engineering firm, to design the master plan at a cost of $988,000. County commissioners
recommended that the district begin a search for qualified candidates to fill the position
of general manager to oversee the program. However, with no permanent funding source
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in place a new general manager would face job insecurity and no budget to hire staff or
begin implementing the master plan. The district decided to postpone the search until the
passage of the bill, but unbeknown to the rest of the county commission and other
entities, McGaughey, Cortez and Woodbury had their eye on a young local engineer
named Virginia Bax.98
As the legislature continued to explore options for Clark County, Assemblyman
Thomas Hickey (D-North Las Vegas) argued that the Clark County Commission should
run the flood control district just like the successful Regional Transportation Commission
(RTC). The RTC had the structure in place and Hickey, along with Bruce Woodbury,
argued that representatives from the various local governments reporting to the county
commission could possibly ensure a quicker implementation of the master plan.
McGaughey countered Hickey’s suggestion with his own blueprint that would become a
defining moment toward the unification of the governments in Clark County.
McGaughey proposed to take flood control out of the hands of the county commissioners
and create an independent regional board to run the district. It would consist of two
county commissioners, two Las Vegas councilmen, and one official each from Henderson
and North Las Vegas, Boulder City and Mesquite who would alternate on the board every
two years. This caused a major stir as commissioners resisted yielding control of the
district. Commissioners Karen Hayes and Bruce Woodbury believed it was
unconstitutional and did not account for “the one man, one vote” ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court. They argued the City of Las Vegas and Clark County would have equal
voting power, effectively leaving hundreds of thousands of county residents without
elected officials. The county commission represented all residents in Clark County, and
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by limiting the commission to two seats on the district’s board Woodbury and Hayes
worried that rural residents would be left out. Research shows that the failure to address
flood control in Clark County occurred partly because the cities never recognize the
county’s power. In a February 13, 1985, interview with the Las Vegas Review Journal,
McGaughey defended his rationale for creating an independent district that was not
controlled by one jurisdiction:
My main concern is to make this flood control system operate
constructively. We have to have representation from every political entity in
the valley. The reality of the matter is, and this is politics, if one entity is in
charge of something, the other political entities next door will feel left out
and won’t give their total support and commitment, and I want to get rid of
that problem.99

McGaughey’s bill created a level playing field, which this thesis argues helped curtail
decades of infighting among jurisdictions and, more importantly, curbed fears of one
local government subordinating its powers to another.100
The bill’s last component created a two-tier oversight structure. First, McGaughey
called for all local public works directors to sit on a Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC). Working with the district’s engineers, the TAC would be charged with proposing
projects. Shortly after first general manager of the flood control district was hired, the
TAC members would develop a list of their top projects and prioritize them in an effort to
reassure residents that all parts of the metro area would receive equal attention. By
creating a technical board, the problem could be solved by treating the metropolitan area
as a whole, without concern for jurisdictional boundaries.
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The second board consisted of private residents from each of the entities in the
valley, and they would be appointed to the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC). The
CAC mirrored the flood control district’s board. The citizens were charged with
monitoring the politicians’ actions and use of funds. McGaughey believed citizens should
run the government, and he knew from his years in construction, the build out of a
massive flood control system would take decades. By having a permanent advisory
committee written into law and with members solely dedicated to flood control, there was
less likelihood of future government officials shelving the district. The CAC would
become important in 1986, when Bruce Woodbury, McGaughey, and other officials
began a public relations tour of Clark County to sell the final funding mechanism to
residents.101
On June 2, 1985, Governor Richard Bryan signed Assembly Bill 169 (AB 169)
into law. It established the RTC as the Board of Directors for the district, which achieved
McGaughey’s goal of creating an independent district. The bill made substantial technical
and policy changes to the 1955 Nevada Revised Statute 543 (NRS 543), which had
created a state flood control policy. AB 169 also granted additional powers to the Clark
County Flood Control District to hire a staff of engineers and various other flood control
specialists to create uniform standards and assist in land use oversight.102
AB169 did not specify the funding mechanism that would be used to pay for the
estimated $200 million in flood control needs for Clark County, but it required the new
district to have a funding source in place by the fall to ensure the question could be on the
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1986 election ballot. So the district’s board moved quickly, holding its first meeting on
July 11, 1985, electing Clark County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury as the first chair, a
position he held until 1990.103 The board immediately approved the funding of a
$380,000 federal study of flood detention measures on the eight major washes in the Las
Vegas valley. A national search for a general manager began the following day.104
AB169’s most important component was that it authorized the district to hire a
chief engineer and general manager. Employing a qualified engineer to manage the
district was a major contributing factor to the district’s success through the 1990s and
into present day. Shortly after the bill was passed, McGaughey and Cortez set out to get a
qualified general manager. In 2010 McGaughey recalled hearing about a young woman
engineer working for Black & Veatch in Las Vegas. Prior to the creation of the district,
Virginia Bax had been working with the Clark County Public Works Department to
design a set of detention basins on the edge of the Red Rock Canyon just west of the
present-day 215 beltway and Charleston Boulevard, as well as a basin in the canyons
feeding the Upper Flamingo wash southwest of Las Vegas. At the time Marty Manning,
the county’s public works director was considered a leading candidate for the position.
But McGaughey considered Manning a political insider and worried that Manning’s
allegiance to one entity or another could be a liability, and his concerns hurt Manning’s
chances, but Bax was a woman, and women had not made it through the “glass ceiling”
in a lot of corporate and government entities in Southern Nevada. To be sure, many local
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officials wanted a man to manage the district. But Bax was smart and capable and
McGaughey prevailed. So, on January 31, 1986, the Clark County Flood Control District
board unanimously Bax as the first chief engineer and general manager of the district.
With a salary ranging between $55-$65,000 per year, she became the highest-paid female
government employee in the county’s history.105
Once Bax was hired, the district could focus on holding public hearings and
approving a sustainable funding mechanism. In early February board members rejected
McGaughey’s proposal to fund the district through a property tax. Instead, Woodbury and
other members of the board recommended that a one-quarter of a cent sales tax increase
be the funding source put on the 1986 general election ballot. As Woodbury explained at
a public hearing on January 31, 1986, “The property tax has been overworked. Sales tax
is much less of a burden of the overage citizen. We’re already paying 6 cents on many
dollars spent because the [five and three-quarter] tax is being round off.”106 In 1986, only
seven-percent of all property in Clark County was privately owned, but nearly 30 percent
of the local sales taxes were paid by tourists. In an effort to show the residents that flood
control was moving beyond decades of infighting, on March 3, 1986, board members
changed the name of the Clark County Flood Control District to the Clark County
Regional Flood Control District. Then on April 24th the CCRFCD officials released a
master plan draft that outlined a forty-year construction schedule. At an estimated cost of
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$835 million, the master plan was a ground-breaking program to correct decades of
mistakes while ensuring that future development would be protected (fig 37).107
By late spring of 1986 the stage was set to tackle the most important task in
finalizing the comprehensive regional flood control plan: convincing Clark County voters
to approve a permanent tax increase for the sole purpose of protecting the metropolitan
area from stormwater. Proponents of the sales tax increase feared a repeat of the failed
1962 bond election, so from May 1986 through the primary election on September 2nd a
small band of dedicated government officials, concerned citizens, and business people led
by Bruce Woodbury, Jim McGaughey and Virginia Bax, convinced residents to vote for a
sales tax increase that benefited present and future residents of Clark County. Few people
understood at the time that the vote was a “now or never” opportunity to move away from
decades of relying on federal handouts and to take local responsibility for funding
regional flood control.
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CHAPTER V
1986-1990
“Floods don’t stop at a stop-sign or a city-limit; they just rage.
We had that in our favor.”108

Figure 28. Martin Luther King Blvd and Pinto Lane, August 18, 1989
(Photo credit to Las Vegas Sun)
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The Now-or-Never Vote
During the winter of 1985-86, the CCRFCD and Southern Nevada legislators
joined forces to map out a campaign strategy to persuade voters in September 1986 to
increase Clark County’s sales taxes by one-quarter of one-percent. Bruce Woodbury gave
Judy Brailsford the responsibility of forming a citizens committee to convince the
community about the need for adequate flood control. At the time, Brailsford was
running his political campaigns, so in late 1985 she became the public outreach
coordinator for the Citizens for Flood Protection (CFP) campaign. It was her job to
organize the committee, create a speaker’s bureau and get the politicians, flood control
officials and the citizens committee in front of as many Clark County as possible before
the election.109
Brailsford modeled the citizens committee after blue ribbon committees,
traditionally comprised of outstanding citizens in a community who were brought
together to study a complex issue and to publicly endorse a solution. Brailsford believed
that if the CCRFCD lacked a convincing argument for safeguarding the community and
its children, the tax increase would be doomed to failure. Jim McGaughey recommended
Ann Zorn, the district’s CAC chair, to also lead the Citizens for Flood Protection and to
be part of the speaker’s bureau. Zorn headed the Southern Nevada League of Women
Voters chapter and her husband, Roman J. Zorn had been UNLV’s president from 196973. McGaughey considered her a pragmatic, nonpartisan problem-solver who would
focus on the issues and not get sidetracked. For his part, the Republican Woodbury called
upon M.J. Harvey, who had become an outspoken activist for flood control after the
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massive floods of 1983 and 1984 nearly destroyed her community. Brailsford and
McGaughey believed that Zorn, a Democrat, and Harvey, a Republican, would show the
community that flood control transcended politics. “This was an issue,” Brailsford stated
in a 2010 interview, “that had no political or geographic boarders -- floods don’t stop at
stop signs or a city-limit; they just rage.” The group knew it had the community’s
universal concern about flooding in its favor.110
Woodbury felt that government officials seeking re-election in 1986 needed to
make flood control part of their campaign, so he asked fellow county commissioners
Manny Cortez and Thalia Dondero, City of Las Vegas Mayor Ron Lurie, and Las Vegas
Commissioner Al Levy to participate in the speaker’s bureau. By August 1986,
Woodbury and the CFP had received over fifty endorsements for their campaign from all
the major local media outlets, both political parties, every local government commission,
and numerous civic and organizations.111
Woodbury headed up the grass-roots campaign and Bax covered the design
portion, while Harvey and Zorn were vital to giving the presentations a personal touch.
Over a period of nine months, Brailsford set up 162 meetings across Clark County. They
were so passionate about flood control that they spoke to any meeting of citizens of two
or more. In a 2010 interview, Bax (now Virginia Valentine) remembered one presentation
at a mobile home park on the valley’s east side where they spoke in front of an audience
composed of “one guy in flip-flops.” The presentations were 20-30 minutes long; they
began with photo slides dating as far back as the 1906 and 1910 floods in Meadow
110
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Valley, to show the region’s historic vulnerability to flooding. Woodbury would discuss
why the community needed comprehensive flood control; Bax then covered the Master
Plan; Harvey and Zorn then emphasized how flooding affected every valley resident; and
McGaughey closed by urging the audience to please vote for the quarter-cent sales tax.112
Every time he mentioned the tax increase Woodbury, Brailsford and the other
politicians would cringe. McGaughey defended this approach because he believed that
presenting the residents with a reasonable flood control plan and how it would be funded
would lead to more voter support on Election Day. During this same time, fiscal
conservatives across the state were paying close attention to California’s Question 13,
which, if passed, would have stopped all new tax increases. Woodbury made a simple but
effective argument against those pushing a similar proposal in Nevada. He knew that
Clark County’s sales tax would eventually rise, following the lead of Washoe and Nye
County sales tax increases. He believed the extra revenue should go to flood control,
which 96 percent of surveyed county residents believed was needed. In his presentation,
Woodbury stressed the importance of putting it toward flood control rather than letting
some other agency get the dollars. He told reporters that “merchants favor the increase
because it’s easier to figure out, and people have the perception they’re paying 6 percent
anyway.”113
To ensure the highest quality media campaign, Woodbury called upon his long
time political strategist, Kent Orem, to produce the advertisements. Orem brought much
experience to Woodbury’s team. He had been running campaigns since the early 1970s,
and by the mid-1980s, was considered by many local politicians an expert in building
112
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advertising campaigns for tax increase initiatives. During the late 1970s and early 1980s
his company, OIZ Advertising conducted numerous local and regional polls which
uncovered a disturbing trend about voters in the American Southwest. Its data revealed
that the more time passed between events such as the 1984 floods and the 1986 election
to combat them, the more likely the tax or bond measure would fail. In Orem’s opinion,
local voters had to see the flood devastation near Election Day. Recognizing that 1986
might not witness the same intense storms and devastation as 1983 and 1984, he advised
Woodbury and Brailsford to constantly remind the community, with pictures and video of
the devastation.114
Later in the spring of 1986 Brailsford and Orem’s team created a political action
committee (PAC) to raise money, which they named after the Citizens for Flood
Protection committee. Since Bax and her staff were county employees, Woodbury
chaired the PAC. In less than a month, it raised nearly $100,000 for a late summer media
blitz across Clark County. OIZ Advertising designed print ads, recorded radio spots, and
produced television commercials complete with images and footage from past floods.
Leading up to the September election, local television stations ran several commercials.
One in particular featured Woodbury in Overton, knee-deep in mud and water, filling
sandbags on the banks of a swelling wash. Another showed long-time local reporter Fred
Lewis covering earlier floods across Southern Nevada. Orem even pulled images from
the 1975 Caesars Palace flood to remind residents that floods also threatened the vital
tourism industry, the lifeblood of the local economy. The flood control funding campaign
was so successful that over the next three decades Orem and OIZ Advertising worked
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with other politicians and government agencies to secure funding approval for their local
and state-wide initiatives.115
Predictably, the only opposition to the sales tax increase came from Carol Vilardo
and Everett Perlberg of the Nevada Taxpayers Association. During the final negotiations
for AB169 in 1985, Vilardo and Perlberg raised their concerns about McGaughey’s
funding mechanism lacking a “sunset” clause. Vilardo argued that residents would not
have the opportunity to roll back the tax increase, and Perlberg wanted to know: “How do
you get the population to exercise veto rights?” Woodbury responded that a formal date
to remove the tax increase might threaten federal matching funds the Army Corps of
Engineers had earmarked for Southern Nevada once the sales tax increase passed. After
the voters approved the tax increase in September and with great confidence that the
federal matching funds would be secured, Woodbury and Brailsford convinced
McGaughey to allow Vilardo and Perlberg to push through AB-115, which put language
in the flood control legislation to allow a ten-year “sunset” clause. In Woodbury’s
opinion, by 1995 the master construction plan would be one-third complete, making it
virtually impossible to stop the program’s positive impact on the community. In 1987,
AB115 amended AB169 with the proper wording for a proposed public review and vote
in 1995. Nevertheless, during the summer of 1986 some members of the CFP still feared
that the funding request would not pass. In 2010, Brailsford recalled worrying that voters
would reject the ballot question even with all the endorsements, public support, and the
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well-funded media campaign, leaving no alternative to solve the problem. Even
McGaughey warned Woodbury and the CFP that this was a “now or nothing vote.”116
Although support from the community continued to increase, as the mild spring
weather began to show signs of the coming summer heat and the possibility of more
floods, proponents of the measure were torn between hoping for heavy rains to soak the
valley and fearing that another summer of deadly storms would bring more death and
destruction. The year 1985 was the first in a quarter century when no one was killed in a
Clark County flood. From a political standpoint there was growing concern that without a
major flood in 1986, voters might not consider flooding enough of a threat to justify
raising taxes. One Las Vegas Sun reporter wrote in June that “everybody talks about the
weather, but nobody’s willing to do anything about it.”117 A common joke in the
community was that “Southern Nevada only gets seven inches of rain a year, but it gets it
all in one day.” Past funding measures had failed because, as Governor Richard Bryan
told the Las Vegas Sun in 1984, valley residents were always guilty of “sunny day
voting” on flood control.118 The 1962 bond election was held in April, two months prior
to the region’s flood season. Later research concluded that many local residents viewed
the 1955 flood as an anomaly and assumed the valley would never experience stormwater
of the magnitude again, because it had not flooded in the metropolitan area since 1955.
But this proved to be wishful thinking, a reaction that flood control proponents hoped
would not delude voters again.119
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McGaughey and Woodbury also understood that phrasing a ballot question was
equally important as important as the campaign message. “The attitude of a lot of voters,”
McGaughey told a reporter in July 1986, “is when in doubt, vote no.”120 Local officials
agreed that the wrong wording could make it appear as if the county was creating a new
tax, rather than raising the sales tax a quarter-cent. More importantly, Woodbury
recognized that some residents had short memories about flooding, so the vote, in
McGaughey’s opinion, had to be as close to the flood season as possible. A local survey
of valley residents in 1984 asked respondents to rank the major issues facing the
community; they listed flooding as the number-one threat. The same survey was
conducted in early 1986, but flooding did not make the top-twenty. To make matters
worse, Assemblyman Marvin Sedway (Democrat – Las Vegas) warned McGaughey and
Woodbury that if floods hit again with no structures in place to lessen the damage, the
cities and county needed to understand that the state lacked the funds to bail them out.121
So McGaughey included unusual language in AB169 that required voter approval
of the district’s final funding proposal during the primary election in September 1986.
Traditionally, all funding requests were put on the November general election ballot. But
McGaughey wanted to ensure that residents voted on the funding measure during the
flood season. In addition, he did not want to compete with other funding questions,
because there was a concern that voters might see multiple requests for money on the
ballot and vote for another proposal, or maybe none at all. “If I’m the Lone Ranger,” he
recalled in 2010, “then I’ve got a shot.”122
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In what would become a very important component of the later flood control
system, the City of North Las Vegas, using funds from the 1981 flood control bond sale,
had completed a $2.9 million detention basin in early 1984. Thanks to the project during
the devastating storms of 1984 the areas south of the basin had been protected from the
deadly floods, a fact touted by Woodbury and the others during the 1986 campaign.
Indeed, the impact of the new detention basin on the quality of life downstream from its
protective barrier resonated across the valley and encouraged Woodbury and the CFP to
push forward. By late 1985 the CCRFCD had already prioritized ten projects similar to
the North Las Vegas basin, and they all were ready to start construction once the tax
revenues began to flow in by mid-1987. The North Las Vegas basin became a posterchild for the regional master plan, because the plan represented a major leap forward in
the flood control fight. For the first time in eighty years, the community had a pro-active
solution to flood threats across all municipal boundaries that would use federal matching
funds.123
The Nevada Department of Taxation calculated that the one-quarter of one
percent sales tax increase would generate roughly $1 million per month for the district.
Shortly after Montgomery Engineers completed the design of the Master Plan, the
CCRFCD announced its estimated construction cost. At the National Association of
Counties conference in Las Vegas, Woodbury, Bax and Zorn unveiled the ambitious
build-out schedule for flood control channels and detention basins. They told delegates
from all over America that the first phase would take 10-20 years to complete at an
estimated cost of $389 million. Once the current “patch work” system was corrected and
the developed lands that were prone to flooding had been protected, then Phase Two
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would begin. Officials estimated that this phase would cost $447 million and take two
decades to complete.124
The July meeting of the National Association of Counties was the first time
Woodbury’s team provided the public with cost estimates and projected time-lines. Prior
to Montgomery’s recommendations, officials had speculated the first phase would only
cost taxpayers $200 million. Woodbury, Orem and Brailsford knew it would had been
political suicide if the real projected cost of the Master Plan was revealed. In a 2010
interview, Brailsford explained that no one in the campaign ever mentioned “billions”
during their meetings, because there had never been a public works project in the
Southwest with a price tag exceeding a billion dollars.125 It can be concluded that
officials close to the project knew the cost was going to be in the billions, so they made a
conscious decision to lower their public projections. Orem and Brailsford conducted
opinion polls prior to the formal announcement of the cost. The overwhelming consensus
from respondents was that even with federal matching funds if the plan’s estimated cost
came in above a billion dollars it would be defeated (as of 2009 the Master Plan was 20
years old, with a price tag of $1.3 billion and 30 years remaining until phase two would
be completed). It is important to note that when the district began building projects in the
late 1980s the cost per mile of channel was $2 million. At the peak of the local building
boom in 2007, costs per mile of channel reached $10 million. In early 2011, the cost per
mile dropped to $7 million.126
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While the Master Plan seemed near perfect on the surface, out-of-state delegates
from the National Association of Counties could not comprehend how local officials
could persuade residents living uphill from the heavy flood risk areas to vote for the sales
tax increase. Woodbury merely responded that “It would take skillful political
campaigning.” As Woodbury, Bax, McGaughey, Zorn and Harvey told voters in 1986,
flooding affected everyone. When fire trucks, police cars, and ambulances could not enter
an area because roads were under several feet of water, it threatened the quality of
everyone’s life. Since the 1975 Caesars Palace flood, the Las Vegas tourism industry,
Southern Nevada’s primary industry and largest employer, saw a significant number of
cancelled hotel reservations following every major rain storm. Zorn felt the primary
reason why the measure would pass was that this was a pocketbook issue. The state and
federal government would not, and probably could no longer afford to fund flood disaster
clean-up in Clark County. Also, without a comprehensive plan and regional board to
oversee building code compliance and enforcement of new construction it would have
been virtually impossible for the community to qualify for FEMA’s National Flood
Insurance Program. This exposed the entire valley to major financial hardship if another
season of flooding like 1984 were to occur. So, fearful of losing their homes and
businesses, Clark County residents went to the polls on September 2, 1986 and
overwhelmingly approved, by a 2-1 margin, the one-quarter of one percent sales tax
increase.127
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Unification of Clark County
On September 3, 1986, a delighted and obviously relieved Woodbury and BaxValentine (she got married during the summer campaign), told local media outlets that
their top priorities were to announce the first ten construction projects and request
McGaughey and fellow assemblyman, Danny Thompson, to move the tax collection up
from March 1, 1987 to January 1, 1987, which would give the CCRFCD and extra $2
million in funds. Shortly after the vote, local planning departments recognized that the
district would have to work with the cities and county to adopt ordinances requiring all
developers to follow the same building standards in flood plains. This added
responsibility would help guarantee that future building across the valley’s open desert
would follow uniform standards that conformed to the flood control system’s standards.
For example, the cities and county each required that builders reserve space for flood
control structures within their planned subdivisions. Some of these bisected streets and
even ran through blocks and between homes. In all situations, the CCRFCD and its needs
became paramount.128
By October 1986, McGaughey’s plan to eliminate corruption in the building
permit departments and tighten enforcement began to unfold. Everett Perlberg of the
Nevada Taxpayers Association submitted a recommendation to the Legislative
Commission, suggesting that the district’s Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), made
up of local public works staff and directors, have the final say over whether developers
could obtain flood control variances for their projects. Leading up to the September vote,
a common resident question of officials was: “Why do permit departments let developers
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build in the washes?”129 By removing the elected officials from the variance process, this
virtually illuminated the chance of corruption. Gone were the days of developers greasing
the pockets of elected officials or getting verbal approvals to cut corners on flood control.
With the TAC board staffed with engineers from each jurisdiction in Clark County, a
developer could no longer undermine the process. Woodbury himself objected to the
TAC having veto power over the district’s board, which was made up of elected officials.
It can only be assumed that Woodbury, who never had any ethics issues in his 28-year
career, objected to the TAC having veto rights because by law it was the elected officials’
responsibility to decide if a construction variance would be in the community’s best
interest. Over the past twent-five years, the district has only approved two or three Master
Plan variances.
During the same Legislative Commission meeting, Perlberg also requested that a
cap be put on how much money could be spent on the district’s administration. The
Nevada Taxpayers Association wanted the costs limited to 15 percent. McGaughey had
always wanted the district’s staff to remain small in order to keep administrative costs
low. This would ensure that more miles of channel and basins could be built. Historically,
CCRFCD has kept its annual operations expenses (salaries, engineering studies, etc.) at
less than 10 percent of sales tax revenues. The district does not manage the construction
of flood control projects; that responsibility falls on developers of new land and the
jurisdictions in which the projects are located. CCRFCD prioritizes projects, updates the
Master Plan every five years, and allocates funds to the various jurisdictions in Clark
County. It has been vital for the district to streamline its overhead to maximize every
dollar for construction. Compared to other special service districts such as the Las Vegas
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Metropolitan Police Department, Regional Transportation Committee (RTC), Clark
County School District, Clark County Library District and the Southern Nevada Water
Authority, the administrative cost versus money for projects makes CCRFCD the most
efficient special district in Clark County.
In addition to McGaughey’s plan to keep the district’s administrative costs low,
he put specific language into the AB169 mandating that revenue from the one-quarter of
one percent sales tax could only be used for flood control. During the negotiation process
in 1985, local public works officials wanted language in the bill to allow funding for
bridge construction with flood control money -- a debate that has intensified during the
current economic crisis. McGaughey defeated their request by defining flood control as
building channels and detention basins. The only time a bridge could be funded by
CCRFCD was when a flood control project affected an existing bridge or required a
bridge to span a new channel. By the late 1990s the district began receiving requests for
funding to cover cosmetic improvements around basins. Because McGaughey’s language
was so specific about funding guidelines, the district was able to refuse requests for “soft
issues” like parks, side-walks, lamps or landscaping.130
Following the successful passage of AB3 on January 28, 1987, which moved the
start date of the tax increase from July 1, 1987 up to March 1, 1987, the CCRFCD cleared
its last political hurdle. On February 13, Virginia Bax-Valentine presented the list of
projects that the district’s staff and elected officials from all Clark County governmental
entities had been working on for weeks. For the first time in the valley’s history, the
area’s historically fragmented governments worked together to coordinated flood control.
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Clark County and the City of Las Vegas governments never liked each other. In Resort
City in the Sunbelt, Eugene Moehring argued that this fragmentation had resulted from
Las Vegas’s historic inability to annex its suburbs.131 In his opinion, casino gambling was
the culprit. The great Strip resorts repulsed all city attempts to tax their games and annex
their property. The regionalization of flood control, like the need to coordinate highway
construction and planning, became a catalyst for all the cities and county to come
together. The political composition of the independent board required political foes to sit
down at the same table, get acquainted with other officials and build cooperative
relationships. Prior to the CCRFCD, except for the Regional Transportation Commission
there was no formal mechanism in place for representatives from entities to get together
and solve common problems. Bax-Valentine outlined $135 million in projects that
covered each of Clark County’s geographic areas: Northern Las Vegas Valley, Central
Las Vegas, Southwest Las Vegas and the rural communities of Boulder City, Moapa,
Overton and Mesquite. The first eight years of the construction plan was based on which
projects would protect the largest number of residents, lives and property. During the
winter of 1986-87, turf wars began to diminish and a consensus developed to make the
solution to eighty years of flood threats the priority of all. 132
Credibility Through Resolve
In less than three years, state, county, and city governments pulled together and
passed legislation allowing Clark County to raise money for flood protection and for an
education program to inform residents about flood hazards and the district’s ambitious
eight-year construction schedule. On March 1, 1987, the district began what many flood
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control officials have estimated to be a fifty-year build out of flood control measures
designed to protect all the developed land in Clark County and accommodate future
growth. The district began its initial construction projects in those parts of Clark County,
Las Vegas, Henderson and North Las Vegas where flood control would protect the lives
and property of the greatest number of residents (Appendix I).133 However, the patience
of local residents was tested by the amount of time it took local governments and
CCRFCD to curb the flood problem after the 1986 vote. Even though the first regional
flood control project funded by the sales tax increase was awarded to Las Vegas Paving
Corporation in November 1987, early projects in the eight-year plan Bax-Valentine
announced were designed to correct decades of mistakes. In addition, projects could only
be constructed when sales tax revenues were received. This “pay-as-you-go” program
created major problems for the district planning massive basins to be built in the 1990s.
In 1990 millions of dollars in flood damage occurred because the two major washes in
the south part of the valley were delayed two or three years due to the lengthy preparation
of environmental impact studies. These had to be prepared after federal officials
designated the desert tortoise as an endangered species. In addition, officials had to revise
the Master Plan to allow for the explosive growth that beset the valley at century’s end.
Also, some progress was made in fixing prior mistakes. Unfortunately, there was
continued loss of life. Despite major advances in flood control mitigation, stormwater
destroyed property and took lives in the metropolitan area during the early year’s of the
system’s construction.134
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Woodbury, Bax-Valentine, and McGaughey were the driving force to keep the
Master Plan intact in the late 1980s. But it soon became apparent in 1988 and 1989 that
constructing the flood control system would be the easiest part for the board, staff and
supporters of the CCRFCD. McGaughey’s fear about over zealous city public works
directors attempting to siphon off district funds was vindicated in early 1988 when Las
Vegas public works director Richard Goecke requested $1 million a mile for road
improvements near CCRFCD projects. Woodbury and Bax-Valentine had to seek an
attorney general’s opinion even though AB 169 and subsequent amendments to the bill
clearly identified the types of projects that could be funded by the revenue from the onequarter of one percent sales tax.135
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required the CCRFCD to submit an
Environmental Assessment (EA), a mandate for all communities receiving federal funds
for projects that could significantly impact the human environment. In an effort to ensure
that federal matching funds would not be held up, the district hired Dames & Moore to
consult on the ten-year Master Plan’s potential impact on residents. Officials expected the
firm to complete the review and submit a snap-shot of its findings by late 1988. However,
during the preparation of the EA, CCRFCD officials received notification from EPA that
the desert tortoise, which had been on the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s “Threatened”
species list since the early 1980s, was being move to an “Endangered” status. Even
though the district had been working on the EA, the escalation of the desert tortoise’s
status to an “endangered species” required it to submit a full report of the Master Plan’s
environmental impact. The district assigned Tim Sutko, the senior hydrologist, to write
the Environmental Impact Statement (ESI). His team had to address the Fish & Wildlife
135
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staff’s mitigation concerns to protect the desert tortoise. Fish & Wildlife required the
district to install special fences in tortoise habitats, or pay for animal’s the relocation. The
ESI took almost eighteen months to be approved, which further delayed construction in
many areas.136
The ESI added to the construction time-line, and by late 1988 the district was
ready to begin construction on the Upper Flamingo detention near the present-day
intersection of Russell Road and Durango Drive, which would prevent the type of
flooding that caused the massive damage at Caesars Palace in 1975. Without the report
from the Fish & Wildlife agency, the district could not receive the appropriate right-ofway grants to construct the basin and channels or the $100 million in federal matching
funds. Bax-Valentine, therefore, filed an appeal in early 1989 to the Council of
Environmental Quality (CEQ), a federal board made up of members from the Fish &
Wildlife Agency, EPA, and Soil and Water Conservation. The district also lobbied Harry
Reid and other Nevada Congressmen to push for the CEQ to allow the district to move
forward. In the end, the CEQ made a rare exception to the Endangered Species Act and
approved the building of basins and channel prior to the final EIS being submitted in the
early 1990s.137
Once the CEQ gave the district the go-ahead, local officials requested the $100
million in federal matching funds and land right-of-ways. The last major federal hurdle
was overcome in the summer of 1989. Later that year, Woodbury and McGaughey met to
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discuss the district’s progress. Woodbury knew the district could never fund the
construction of large detention basins needed on the metropolitan area’s periphery. Under
AB169, projects had to be built with a “pay-as-you-go” model, which required funds to
be in place before construction could begin. The five largest basins and the miles of
down-flow channels planned for the first ten-years of Phase One would take decades to
fund. Woodbury was also concerned that smaller projects to correct the existing “patchwork” problems would not be built because money would have to be diverted for larger
projects. Both men knew this contradicted the district’s mission to spread the
construction projects fairly across the entire county. With monthly revenues of $1 million
from the sales tax, Woodbury worried that it would take decades to fund the construction
of a single detention basin, much less hundreds of miles of conveyance channels needed
to connect the future system across the valley. 138
Woodbury, therefore asked McGaughey to consider sponsoring a bill to allow
Clark County to sell bonds on behalf of the CCRFCD. The bonds would pay for the
larger construction projects and speed up the time-line. Both men knew that the Army
Corps of Engineers’ feasibility study and the recommendations for the Tropicana and
Flamingo washes would be submitted later that year. Moreover, flood control officials
estimated the construction on these two washes alone would cost in excess of $300
million, of which the CCRFCD would be responsible for nearly $85 million in matching
funds. At first, McGaughey had reservations about Woodbury’s bill request. They had
campaigned together in 1986 for the “pay-as-you-go” system, promising voters no loans
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or no interest payment.139 McGaughey also feared a large influx of money could
potentially corrupt the process and sabotage the entire Master Plan. McGaughey spent the
remainder of 1989 evaluating the progress of the tax revenue and reviewed construction
cost estimates from contractors. By mid-1990, he agreed with Woodbury that “pay-asyou-go” would take decades to show any return on the community’s flood control
investment. Also, he had great faith in Bax-Valentine and the CAC to curtail the potential
of abuse, ensuring that the tax revenue would go toward future bond payments. So during
the 1991 legislature, McGaughey successfully sponsored AB455, which allowed the
CCRFCD to let Clark County sell bonds on the district’s behalf. In October of 1991 the
county was able to sell $81 million in bonds. As a preventive measure, he also wrote a
second bill, AB462, to prohibit the district from using flood control money for the
construction, operation, maintenance, or repair of streets, highways or bridges. The
language McGaughey added allowed flood control officials and elected officials in the
1990s and today to successful defend against other agencies’ attempts to siphon off flood
control general funds for their own projects.140
From 1986 to 1990, County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury, working with State
Assemblyman James McGaughey, designed legislation that established the CCRFCD and
funded its fifty-year effort to protect the Las Vegas metropolitan area from flooding.
They also secured further legislation giving the district bonding capacity to accelerate its
construction program. Still, even in 1990, there was no time for self congratulation over
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their historic achievements. Local floods that year damaged more property and took more
lives, making it even more urgent to get the system built as quickly as possible.

120

CHAPTER VI
1990-2010
“You can keep the water away from the people,
or keep the people away from the water.”141

Figure 29 Las Vegas Middle Branch Channel
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)
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Flood of 1990
The summer of 1990 was the worst year for the CCRFCD. First, Bruce Woodbury
announced he would not run for re-election as chair of the district and would instead
focus on the Regional Transportation Commission (RTC) to work on a plan to curb gridlock across the valley. From 1991 to 2002, the RTC spent millions to re-design the major
freeway interchanges at Interstate 15 and U.S. 95, commonly called the “Spaghetti
Bowl.” Woodbury also worked to get the massive Las Vegas beltway (that now bears his
name) funded and designed. Besides Woodbury’s departure, the district in 1990 also
suffered from delayed construction projects on the Flamingo and Tropicana Washes, as
the Army Corps of Engineers awaited approval from Washington D.C. certifying that its
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) had been accepted. In June and July, two large storms
hit Las Vegas and Henderson. Fortunately, within the Las Vegas city limits, heavy
downpours fell over the western section of the city, and the newly constructed Angle
Park, Gowan and Meadows detention basins captured the stormwaters, protecting homes
in the fledgling Summerlin master planned community. But in the southwest parts of the
valley the small number of district facilities already built could not prevent massive
flooding. Block walls toppled and 6-inch reinforced concrete buckled as flood waters
raged. Three people died during the storms, and private and commercial property owners
reported nearly $2 million in damages. The 1990 floods epitomized a problem the district
would face for nearly fifteen years – having projects prioritized and planned, but not
constructed when a major storm hit an unprotect section of the valley. During this period,
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some flood control officials would simply tell critics: “If you can tell me where it is going
to rain, then we will build the next project.”142
During the early afternoon of Sunday, June 10, 1990, a large storm front covered
the Las Vegas valley. In a matter of a few hours one and a half inches of rain fell. In
Henderson, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints rushed from
their worship service to aid neighbors in the Green Valley Country Club community.
Rapidly rising flood water forced people to sandbag around their homes while also trying
to keep storm drains from clogging to prevent the water from breaching a retaining wall
and flooding hundreds of homes. In the excitement, Raymond Kunts, a 19-year-old
member of the church went missing. Rescue officials speculated that he fell into a
manhole whose cover had been washed way; the Coroner’s office recovered his body the
next day about three blocks from where the group had been working.143
As usual, people continued to risk their lives by attempting to cross flooded
washes, drive through standing water and disregard the slick road conditions created by
the storms. That day, every city and county emergency agency received rescue calls
about people trapped in flood channels and storm-related motor vehicle accidents. There
were also fatalities. Misty Alexander, a 25-year-old Henderson resident, drowned on her
way to work. Needing to get to work in Las Vegas, she could go no further when the
flood waters began to run over the road at the intersection of Russell Road and Topaz
Street, east of McCarran International Airport. Eyewitnesses told authorities that
Alexander drove around other cars stopped and inched into the intersection. As soon as
her tires entered the rushing water, Alexander’s car was swept down the road. People on
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the edge of the water later recalled seeing the terror in her eyes. As the car neared a
natural wash, the traumatized Alexander put her hands on the wheel and just calmly
placed her head on the steering wheel as if to pray for help. The car tumbled into the
wash and lodged against a concrete abutment. Rescue workers were helpless against the
pressure caused by the stormwater rushing at a velocity of 40 miles per hour. The water’s
force held the doors closed sealing Alexander’s fate. The Clark County Fire Department
pulled her body from the car fourty minutes later.144
One month after her death, Rose Lynn Worcester, a 25 year-old mother of two
was killed on the evening of Sunday, July 16, 1990. It was Worcester’s third day as a
coffee shop hostess at Whiskey Pete’s Hotel and Casino. It was her turn in the car-pool
rotation to drive employees to Whiskey Pete’s 45-miles south of Las Vegas (which is
now Primm). As her shift ended, a massive thunderstorm producing nearly two and a half
inches of rain hit the valley. After dropping off the last co-worker on Tropicana west of
the Strip, Worcester headed north on Arville. When she pulled up to the Flamingo Wash
in her Honda mini-van the water was running extremely fast and deep. Flood officials
later determined that at the time of her death, the wash had seven feet of rushing water. A
tow truck driver returning from service calls pulled up behind Worcester, and reported
seeing her inching her wheels slowly into the waters. In a matter of seconds the force of
the water grabbed her van and sent it down Flamingo Wash, past the Rio Hotel and
Casino, towards Caesars Palace and the Strip. The following morning a limousine driver
discovered her body in the first floor parking lot of the Imperial Palace.145
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What made these deaths so tragic was the fact they were preventable. Still, flood
control and local officials faced a public backlash over the deaths of Worcester and
Alexander. Attorney Mike Mansfield, represented the CCRFCD on the Worcester case,
but he decided to settle out of court even though authorities ruled that the though cause of
death was negligence on Worchester’s part. He convinced the district to give each of her
two sons $10,000, which was highest amount that could be paid out with no additional
finance committee approvals. Mansfield feared that if the district or Clark County took it
to trial, they might lose because of public sympathy for the victims. In 1991, various
attorneys for Clark County advised officials to settle out of court on twenty-six flood
damage claims resulting from the June and July floods of 1990. Clark County, which was
self-insured, settled for $615,873.146
In the weeks following Alexander’s death, public outcry over the area’s
continuing lack of flood protection proved hard for officials to address. Ironically, in the
area where Alexander drowned the district planned to install a new underground system
in early 1991 to prevent stormwater from flowing over the channels walls. Even though
many residents in the affected areas viewed this as a constructive solution, for many it
was “just a day late and a dollar short like flood control always was.”147 During this
period, Urban Livengood, Clark County’s deputy director of public works, expressed his
concern over people not respecting the posted warnings and driving through flooded
streets. Some residents expressed frustration over the slow progress of flood control, and
there was a growing perception that past flood control projects were now “man-made
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death traps.”148 In a statement by Livengood after Alexander’s death, which would be
echoed by flood control officials following every major flood over the next fifteen years,
“We’re putting in a storm-drain system that will collect this water.” More importantly,
this statement acknowledged how the negative legacy of the 1960s, 1970s and early
1980s substandard mitigation, ignorance and neglect of flood hazards continued to haunt
the rapidly expanding metropolitan area.149
Through the early 1990s, flood control officials, local planning departments and
building inspectors faced the difficult task of trying to enforce stricter building codes
lined out by the NFIP and adopted by the local municipalities in the late 1970s. In 1991,
Virginia Bax-Valentine told the Las Vegas Review Journal: “One source of problems we
know about is something gets approved and then it is not built the way it was planned.”150
It became apparent to flood control officials that the building department’s inability to
close the permit process’ approval and inspection loop jeopardized the entire regional
system. For example, the City of Las Vegas did not employ a full-time inspection staff
during this period. Following the 1990 floods a local reporter discovered that the city’s
quality control people had been allowing private developers and their engineering firms
to hire a quality control firm of their choice to supervise the sub-contractors’ installation
of flood control measures, while the city staff only performed spot checks.151
In other instances, bureaucratic inefficiencies caused the problems. During a 1991
government records audit, Richard French, a hydrologist for the Las Vegas-based Desert
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Research Institute, uncovered numerous instances of one department rejecting a project’s
drainage study while another department, not adequately verifying the “paper trail,”
issued building permits. Brent Leavitt, an attorney for hundreds of flood victims during
the 1980s and 1990s, told reporters in August of 1991 that the valley’s rapid growth,
coupled with the continued flood damage, caused by new development proved that
understaffed planning departments were failing to properly evaluate developers’ drainage
studies. Fortunately for the local agencies, by the mid-1990s communication between
departments had improved, and through better computer systems and increased usage,
more accurate records were being kept. Even though it flooded every year in 1990s and
eleven people lost their lives, local public works departments made great strides in
correcting past “patch-work” mistakes while also completing numerous new projects
designed to implement the Master Plan.152
Building Out the Master Plan
As construction increased in early 1992, larger projects and longer sections of
channels were built, thanks to the $80 million from the 1991 bond issue. During that
fiscal year the district released $47.6 million in new projects with no additional tax
burden levied on the community. In accordance with AB 455, the $15 million collected
from 1992 sales tax revenue went toward bond payments. Also in 1992, Bax-Valentine
testified before the Army Corps of Engineers in support of authorizing the $4 million preconstruction engineering and design of the Tropicana and Flamingo Wash Project.
Construction began on the two washes in 1995 and ended in 2009.153
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Another significant advance in flood protection came when the district ramped up
its early warning system. By 1992 the district monitored 56 stations in and around the
metro area, collecting rainfall data and stream flows. Engineers installed the system after
the 1974 Nelson Landing flood, 50 miles south of Las Vegas which killed five people.
Prior to this early warning system, local flood control engineers relied on the National
Weather Service to predict flooding along Colorado River and the smaller Virgin River.
However, across the expansive and sparsely populated Mojave Desert, rain gauges were
necessary to capture and alert local and state agencies of the possibility of flooding
during high intensity, localized thunderstorms. By 2011 the district’s early warning
system consisted of 170 gauges throughout Clark County, 80 percent located within the
Las Vegas valley.
Also in 1992, flood control officials revisited the possibility of using detention
basins for dual purposes. This idea dated back to 1985, prior to the district’s formation,
when officials from Clark County, Las Vegas and North Las Vegas toured a flood control
playground in Scottsdale, Arizona, built as part of the region’s flood control system. They
were impressed by the use of park-lined floodways rather than concrete ditches to direct
stormwater flows. Unfortunately for Clark County, the Phoenix metropolitan area built
the Indian Bend Greenbelt Floodway using federal subsidies set aside in the early 1970s
for an Army Corps of Engineers’ recreation program. The federally-funded programs
dried up during President Jimmy Carter’s administration. In addition, given the unique
nature of the Las Vegas valley, it would have been difficult to incorporate a system of
greenbelts on the metro area’s periphery and concrete-lined channels in the urban core,
because with a sharp drop in elevation from the mountains down to the Las Vegas Wash
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the green belts would not have been able to slow flood waters sufficiently before they
entered the channels. Also, the potential damage to the parks and greenbelt would have
made it cost prohibitive to repair the system after a massive flood event.154
Later that year, Dundee Jones, the City of Henderson Parks and Recreation
director, received the “go-ahead” from the Henderson City Council to draft plans for a
60-acre sports complex, part of which would be in a flood basin in the Pittman Wash.
Facility architects designed the mesh backstops with hinges, so they could open them up
to let water flow through. The fields were located on the high ground of the basin to
ensure people could safely escape if substantial flood waters entered the basin. Funding
for the project came from a $1.5 million 1988 bond issue, earmarked for developing
recreation areas, which meant flood control funds would not be used for the complex.
This ushered in a dual-use program for hundreds of acres of valuable land that required
flood control officials to construct detention basins throughout the metropolitan area.
Presently, a large portion of the sports complexes, such as baseball, softball and soccer
fields are built in flood control facilities. All recreation projects are funded by the local
entity, and no Flood Control District funds are used to build or maintain them.
In December 2001, the district adopted policies for dual-use to address the
difference between channels, detention basins and natural washes. By the early 2000s,
funding from the Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act (SNPLMA), which
came from a portion of the sale of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands across
Clark County, gave local entities millions of dollars to design and build parks and
greenways across the valley. In addition, the valley’s rapid growth during this period put
pressure on builders and local officials to provide residents with sufficient open public
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space. Detention basins make great dual-use facilities; however, the district prohibits
recreational facilities in channels or natural washes because in the Las Vegas valley
stormwater can raise seven-feet in eight minutes.155

Figure 30. Lone Mountain Detention Basin
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)
Over time, the CCRFCD lost some of its top leadership. Virginia Bax-Valentine left in
August 1993 to return to the private sector. Gale Frazier, the assistant general manager
took over as interim general manager before the CCRFCD board appointed him as the
district’s general manager, a position he still holds today. During his tenure at the district
Frazier has been considered by many current and former politicians, developers, and
flood control proponents to be the driving force behind the district’s success. Irene Porter,
155

Las Vegas Sun, February 17, 1985. Las Vegas Review Journal¸ August 18, 1991. Las Vegas Review
Journal, June 17, 1991.

130

the executive director for the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, noted in a
2010 interview that “Frazier is an engineer set on one thing, which has been doing the
best job he can do to provide and build a real flood control system.”156
The Waiting Game for Land Was Now Over
While the Indian Bend project in Scottsdale was an effort to prevent development
in identified floodways, the 1985 CCRFCD Master Plan allowed building in flood plains
after detention basins and channels were installed. In the 1960s and 1970s builders could
easily avoid areas of the valley prone to flooding because there was plenty of “safe” land
to build on. But the housing boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, combined with the ever
expanding resort corridor along the Strip, consumed many of the large parcels of
undeveloped land in the urban core. Over time, urban and suburban growth forced home
builders and developers to begin looking at land traditionally in flood zones. Prior to the
regionalization of flood control in 1986, the first builders in flood-prone areas were
required to construct not only adequate mitigation structures to protect their parcels, but
also to build out a large section of structures for the future homes and businesses. For
example, developers stayed away from thousands of acres southwest of Las Vegas
because the cost of improvements would have driven their home prices above market
rates. By the mid-1990s many large home builders such as Lewis Homes, Pardee Homes
and American West Homes began to appreciate the dynamic improvements across the
valley that the CCRFCD was responsible for.
During this period, Bruce Woodbury and the Regional Transportation
Commission (RTC) also began their ambitious beltway project. Woodbury and other
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officials knew that when completed, the beltway would circle the valley, open up
thousands of acres for development, and hopefully relieve the existing freeway system.
By the mid-1990s flood control and RTC projects were built in conjunction with each
other to save on costs and prevent major road closures. This practice saved money and
increasingly protected developers’ investments. Indeed, Robert Lewis, the former owner
of Lewis Homes, recalled in 2010 that once the district laid plans for protecting floodprone lands his company as well as other builders began to ask where the next flood
control project would be installed or the next RTC road paved.157
Residential and commercial builders surveyed the local housing market and
observed patterns in the expansion of the valley’s infrastructure that prepared it for rapid
growth. First, the building of Green Valley in the mid-1980s and then Anthem and Seven
Hills in Henderson in the late 1990s, as well as the southern part of the Strip to Southern
Highlands and Rhodes Ranch in the early 2000s, and then Mountain’s Edge, South
Summerlin, Centennial and Aliante in North Las Vegas all put pressure on the flood
control district. This land and housing boom continued until the housing bubble burst in
late 2006. During these go-go-years, builders forged a close relationship with the
CCRFCD to gain valuable information on future flood control projects planned upstream,
in hopes that their land acquisition teams could purchase all available private lands
around those future projects at the lowest possible cost.158
Of course, flood control in Clark County has always been about protecting the
lives of current residents while planning for future ones. The metro area has grown in a
radial pattern because of the high infrastructure expense incurred from drilling through
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the desert’s hard caliche soil, which virtually prohibits the development of large home
tracts miles beyond the existing network. The cost to bring sewer, water, power, gas to a
new area of the valley determines where communities are built. Frazier noted in 2009 that
“if the district’s job was to facilitate development, all we would have been doing for the
past twenty years was building projects for developers.”159 Those who voted in 1986 for
the funding mechanism and supported the district’s building program had experienced
decades of stormwater damage. Still to this day, many of the original flood control
proponents stress that the people who moved to the valley and contributed to its hyper
growth in the 1990s and early 2000s, owed much to those residents who came together in
1986 to address the flood threat.
The district they created, while it does not facilitate growth, has helped to
safeguard “future” residents. Once a developer disturbs the native desert with buildings
and roads, the CCRFCD ensures that the new development does not tax the surrounding
flood control system. The district requires builders, at their cost, to construct approved
facilities that meet the Master Plan and connect the new facilities to the existing channels.
Once the improvements have been properly installed to meet the design criteria, they are
integrated into the regional system and maintained with flood control funds. In some
cases, if the district identifies a project that can protect a greater number of lives and
property, it will fund the construction. For example, the district paid for the Angel Park
channel to the Gowan Basin, located northwest of Las Vegas, even though it was part of
the Summerlin Master Plan. Officials felt that communities downstream needed to be
protected sooner than the timelines set for the private development in the area.
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Another reason the CCRFCD avoids building in anticipation of future growth is
because it is hard to acquire right-of-way grants for federal lands -- 87 percent of the land
in Nevada is owned by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Also, the district is
precluded from building mitigation structures in national recreation areas, such as the
Lake Mead National Recreation Area or in an instant wilderness study area, which
contain undeveloped federal land retained in its primeval character. Currently within
Clark County, 47,200 acres are designated as wilderness study areas.160 When land
requires flood control facilities on federally managed area, Congress is petitioned to grant
rights-of-way, agree to boundary changes or enter into land exchange agreements. All
three are timely, and more importantly, very costly endeavors to undertake to protect land
not yet developed. The Master Plan allows the district to quickly approve the desired
structures the developer must install after the land has been purchased. By having a long
range plan in place, land can be graded, roads paved, and homes built, and homebuyers
and local business owners can be assured they will be protected from floods.161
The Water is Nearly Controlled
Through the mid-1990s the expanding flood control system captured increased
amounts of stormwater rushing through the valley. During the summers of 1995, 1996,
and1997 flood waters spared the metropolitan area from massive property damage and
loss of life, in part because of the facilities in the ground. Surprisingly, district officials
hoped the Charleston Underpass would continue to fill with stormwater. In their view, the
underpass was the poster-child for continued support of the Master Plan. But amazingly,
even as the underpass continued to flood and even though less than 20-percent of the
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regional system was completed, during the 1997 legislature assembly speaker Richard
Perkins questioned whether the flood control district should still be guaranteed the onequarter of one percent sales tax. Frazier, fearing the default on the bond payments if the
legislature pulled sales tax funding, called upon Jim McGaughey, who had left the
assembly in 1993, to assist in the matter. That spring, McGaughey contacted Bob Price,
chair of the Nevada Taxation Committee, and other influential state officials to ensure
that Perkins’ proposal failed. Fortunately for Clark County residents, Perkins’ attempt to
end the district’s funding was merely a tax-cutting ploy to curry favor with his voting
constituents. One can only wonder if Perkins ever considered the legal obligation to the
pay off the bonds. Nevertheless, the bonding obligations saved the sales tax revenue and
possibly the regional system. Without the bond payments, Perkins or any other over
zealous state politician could have used the “sunset” clause in AB115 to threaten the
district’s longevity.162
Clearly, the district’s expensive work was not over. In April 1999, the CCRFCD
Board of Directors took action to earmark $28 million for the construction of the Freeway
Channel and Bypass Facilities from Alta Drive to Sahara Avenue. The district wanted to
build channels in conjunction with the RTC’s ambitious I-15 and U.S.95 interchange
expansion, at the Spaghetti Bowl. These construction projects west of downtown would
stop the Charleston Underpass from flooding. Unfortunately, the projects were not
finished in time to prevent a massive 1999 flood from devastating homes and property in
the central part of the valley. In parts of the Las Vegas Wash, Duck Creek Wash, and the
Flamingo Wash, the flood waters exceeded the100-year flood standard. The thunderstorm
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hit fast and required over 200 swift water rescues in and around the metro area. Damage
to public and private property exceeded $40 million, and two people drowned. The
county declared a state of emergency, which eventually led to a Presidential Disaster
Declaration. Shortly after the flood waters dried up, Tim Sutko, the district’s senior
hydrologist, told the Review Journal that the storm rivaled the 1984 floods. The Oakey
Detention basin, built in 1992 to protect the expanding western section of the valley,
captured 32 million gallons of stormwater before it could strike a nursing home and the
Opportunity Village center. It can be assumed that without the flood control projects built
through the 1990s, the 1999 flood could have been the deadliest ever to strike the
valley.163
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Figure 31. Intersection of Flamingo Road and the Strip, July 8, 1999.
(Photo found on the web)

Figure 32. Charleston Boulevard Underpass, July 8, 1999.
(photo credit given to Ethan Miller of the Las Vegas Sun)
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Ironically, this flood marked one of the last times the iconic Charleston Underpass
flooded. The clean-up, combined with construction along I-15 and U.S.95, helped
accelerate completion of the protective channels around downtown and the underpass. In
a 2009 interview, Gale Frazier reflected on the “media circus” the flooded underpass
caused throughout the decades: “It reminded people of the danger of flooding.” Without
the visible reminder of the Charleston Underpass, the district relied on its public service
campaigns to educate the community about flooding hazards. In 2000, the county
commission, with the support of all other entities in the valley, designated July as “Flash
Flood Awareness Month.” Dating back to the late 1980s, the district promoted flood
awareness with an annual news conference every July 31st (which remains the official
start of Las Vegas’ flood season), along with various advertising campaigns and later
with the district’s public service television program called “The Flood Channel.” Since
2004, the district has asked residents to submit license plate abbreviations, and in 2007 a
Spanish language abbreviation was added to the contest. Every spring the two winning
selections are used on billboards (fig 33) and in print ads across Clark County.164
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Figure 33. 2010 CCRFCD billboard winners, English and Spanish
(Image courtesy of CCRFCD)

The last major flood to damage the Las Vegas valley occurred on August 19,
2003 in the northwest. The intense thunderstorm dropped two inches of rain over 49
square miles in less than 90-minutes. Gowan Road near U.S.95 became an instant river,
and flood control officials estimated the flow rate down Gowan reached 3,000 cubic feet
per second (a private residential pool holds approximately 3,000 cubic feet of water). No
deaths occurred, but local emergency crews conducted numerous swift-water and
helicopter rescues. Flood waters soaked 60 homes and caused $2 million in private and
public property damage. However, the devastation would have been much worse if not
for the fact that local flood control facilities were completed and in place at the time. The
system captured 400-acre feet of runoff, which is comparable to a football field with 400feet of water on top of it (an acre-foot is 325,851 gallons water). Without those facilities,
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the flow rates down Gowan would have exceeded 10,000 cubic feet per second, which
would have threatened human lives and destroyed hundreds of homes.165

Figure 34. City of Las Vegas Fire Engine trapped, August 19, 2003.
(Image found on the internet)
The 2003 flood hit an area that had additional flood control measures’ approved
and ready for construction, but the event occurred before the projects start dates. Unlike
prior decades of reactive flood control measures, the district stuck to the Master Plan’s
construction priorities and installed the facilities that would have protected the area
around Gowan in accordance with the original schedule. Then came the storms of August
2 and 27, 2007, both of which mirrored the intensity and rainfall measurements of the
2003 storm. But little damage was reported from these storms. Officials noted that heavy
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rains fell over areas in the west of the valley where the entire flood control infrastructure
was built and in the ground. The network of detention basins and channels in place
worked as designed, capturing massive amounts of stormwater and diverting it around
neighborhoods. Between the two storms nearly 700 acre feet of water rushed into the
detention basins, which slowed the water’s velocity before safely conveying it to Lake
Mead.166
More recently during the week of December 17-23, 2010, a sustained low
pressure system remained stationary off the coast of southern California, producing
significant rainfall for much of Clark County and southern Utah. This type of low
pressure system is commonly referred to as the “pineapple express,” because it pumps
moist tropical air from the Pacific Ocean into the continental U.S. During the six days of
constant rainfall, gauges across Southern Nevada reported one to two inches of
accumulation. But in the valley only a few road closures occurred, mostly in the remote
Blue Diamond community and Red Rock National Recreation Area. The flood control
infrastructure functioned as designed, collecting 1335 acre feet of stormwater
(approximately 435 million gallons of water) and conveying it through the system. But
communities beyond the metro area were not so lucky. Indeed, floods ravaged
Bunkerville, Moapa, and Mesquite. And, St George, Utah experienced significant flood
damage when the Virgin River nearly breached its banks. The river also threatened an
earthen dam in Beaver Dam, Arizona, destroying two homes in the small community.167
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Figure 35. A home washing into the Virgin River in the Beaver Dam, Arizona.
(photo credit given to Associated Press)

By January 2011, the regional flood control system had 83 basins and 550 miles
of channel, 130 of which were natural washes that will remain natural pathways.
Currently, Clark County continues to feel the effects of the 2008 recession. With sales tax
revenues continuing their decline since 2007, the district projected revenues for fiscal
year 2010-2011 stood at $65.6 million, which is 15 percent less than the prior year. From
2007 to 2010, sales tax revenues shrunk by 72 percent. Consequently, construction costs
dropped 70 percent during the same period because contractors, struggling to win bids,
significantly lowered their rates. In addition, the current economic climate has caused
greater competition among construction contractors. For example, prior to the 2007
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downturn, four or five construction companies submitted project bids, but by 2010 the
district consistently received bids from fifteen or more companies.168
Surprisingly, as the recession battered the local construction industry, the 2009
economic stimulus packaged of President Barak Obama and Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid did not include earmarks for flood control construction in Clark County. Even
though the regional system in Clark County is a model for public works in the struggling
Southwest and a source of valuable construction jobs, the stimulus bill’s criteria required
that money could only go toward current Army Corps of Engineers projects. The $239
million in federal funds used to complete the Corps’ $336 million Tropicana and
Flamingo Wash projects did not qualify because all the detention basins and channels had
been completed prior to the stimulus bill’s passage. However, the bill did allow the
district to sell $150 million Build America Bonds (BABS), which Clark County sold in
June 2009. The BABS gave the district a 35-percent payback on the interest paid. So,
while the annual interest payment is $9.4 million, which the federal government will
reimburse the district $3.3 million annually for it.169
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Figure 36. The Northeast C-1 channel and basin.
(image courtesy of CCRFCD)
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Figure 37. Las Vegas Valley completed Master Plan as of January 2011.
Areas in blue are completed; areas in orange are planned for the next ten years.

145

The Future is Yet Sustainable
It can be argued as the storms of August 2007 and December 2010 demonstrate
that the flood control system is accomplishing the Master Plan’s goals of safeguarding
the valley from rampaging waters. As the local economy continues to struggle and regain
its momentum during the Great Recession, the Master Plan is in place to ensure that
future growth will be protected.170 However, the legislation governing the district does
not allow funding for projects in anticipation of future growth, preventing valuable
taxpayer money from being wasted on facilities that do not help existing residents. Once
the valley is protected, the district has procedures in place to inspect and possibly
reconstruct facilities built in the early phases of the Master Plan, as well as fund
maintenance projects within the system. As the physical threat of stormwater decreases
with every new flood control project installed, the struggle over sustainable water
resources intensifies.
The Las Vegas metropolitan water area’s resource is unique. Many of America’s
riverfront cities treat waste water and then dump it into the river. Downstream, another
community pulls it out, treats it for human consumption, then the wastewater is treated
and dumped back into the river, and so on and so forth. In the Las Vegas valley it is a
closed cycle – the wastewater is treated and released into the Las Vegas Wash and then
into Lake Mead, where the community’s drinking water is taken from. A decade-long
drought in Southern Nevada and the increased demand for water in the region has
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In December 2010 there were 307 new home building permits issued, Las Vegas Review Journal,
January 17, 2011, compared to 2,733 in October 2007, statistic from Home Builder’s Research.
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lowered Lake Mead nearly 100 feet. It is no surprise that reliable clean water is a major
concern for Southern Nevada’s future.171
In addition to stormwater conveyances, stormwater quality has become a major
environmental issue in the past two decades. Since the 1990s, environmental groups and
clean water advocates have expressed their concern over the untreated stormwater
flowing into the Las Vegas Wash and into Lake Mead.172 Unlike wastewater, stormwater
is not treated before it enters Lake Mead. Flood control officials point to the fact that 90
percent of all the water in the Las Vegas Wash is treated water, while stormwater only
represents 5-percent of the outflow, which historically comes during rain storms lasting
over three to five days. The lake’s pollutant levels spike during these intense rain storms,
but dissipate quickly. District officials point to the ability of coastal communities to trace
sustained pollutant levels back to stormwater because the event frequency is much
higher. Clean water advocates, working in conjunction with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), require these communities to treat stormwater.
For the past decade, the EPA has required all American land developers to submit
a Storm Water Management Plan (SWAMP) for approval. SWAMPs outline the
developer’s physical barriers to prevent erosion and soil runoff, in addition to the general
contractor’s own policies and procedures designed to minimize pollutants from exiting
the construction site. In Clark County, the curb and gutter system connects to the flood
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Kevin Eubanks, assistant general manager CCRFCD, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas,
NV., March 5 and March 30, 2010.
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In 1989 the CCRFCD got involved to assist in protecting the region’s water resources. EPA instructed
local communities and other regulatory agencies to do something about stormwater. Boulder City and
Mesquite were exempt because their populations were small enough. In 1990 the Clark County received the
its first Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System (MSSSS) permit. At that time none of the entities had
funding, so the state looked to the CCRFCD for money. Under NRS543, the district could use funds from
the sales tax increase to protect the environment. Kevin Eubanks, assistant general manager CCRFCD,
interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., March 30, 2010.
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control system. In 2004 the CCRFCD adopted a program to inspect construction sites for
soil runoff and levy steep fines on any developer who did not comply. Currently, the EPA
does not require the CCRFCD to treat the valley’s stormwater prior to its entering Lake
Mead. However, in 2009, the agency itself began “setting the bar higher” on pollutant
levels entering domestic waterways. The district partnered with the Southern Nevada
Water Authority (SNWA) to achieve the EPA’s expectations of stormwater quality.
Presently, the district’s major concern is that the EPA is attempting to set blanket national
standards. In the Las Vegas valley, the first few minutes of a rain storm washes off large
amounts of street pollutants into the flood control system. So, the CCRFCD, in
conjunction with SNWA, is educating the public to assist in preventing pollutants from
entering the system and contaminating Lake Mead.173
As partnerships between the CCRFCD, SNWA and the EPA evolve, their
combined focus will be to ensure that Southern Nevada’s water resources are protected
from man-made pollutants. The current drought affecting Lake Mead water levels, along
with increased water demands for the metropolitan area, the district’s role in the region’s
land-use, stormwater quality and flood plain management will inevitably become more
important in protecting region’s clean water supply.
At the federal level, CCRFCD management practices continue to provide FEMA
with valuable mapping and modeling techniques to help other communities manage their
flood zones. With a proven funding mechanism in place since 1986, FEMA officials
point to the district as a model for other communities considering comprehensive regional
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Ibid. Norma Cox, former chair of Water Resources for League of Women Voters and Las Vegas Wash
Development Committee, interviewed by author, tape recorded, Las Vegas, NV., June 1, 2010. Peter
Jackson, City of Las Vegas Flood Control Senior Assistant Engineer, interviewed by author, tape recorded,
Las Vegas, NV., March 25, 2009.
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flood control to evaluate. The higher local regulatory standards adopted in the 1980s for
new construction allow FEMA to focus on higher risk areas primarily along the nation’s
coastal and river systems. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it became imperative that
communities in flood-prone regions take proactive measures to mitigate flood hazards.
FEMA is currently in the process of recertifying all major levees across America.
Even with language written into NRS 543 that could dissolve the district after the
balance of flood control projects are completed and despite the fact that the 2008-2010
recession slowed residential and commercial development in the region, periodic storms
will continue to pound Clark County. Over the next fifty years as the Master Plan’s build
out is completed, many of the early channels will require reinforcement or reconstruction.
During the foreseeable future the revenues from the one-quarter of one-percent sales tax
and the money generated from bond sales will be needed to fund maintenance and
upgrades to detention basins, channels and other flood control facilities. The metropolis’
future growth patterns will be integrated into the existing regional system because of the
long-range planning embedded in the district’s Master Plan and because of the uniform
building standards and regulations developed over the past quarter-century.
Conclusion
Like other burgeoning desert cities, Las Vegas and its suburbs postponed a
systematic approach to street flooding for as long as possible. Even after the municipality
and Strip began to expand across numerous washes that once lay beyond the built-up
areas, voters were slow to fund the occasional bond issues that usually followed
destructive floods. Las Vegans were more concerned with building streets, schools, and
other high-priority projects. For most of the twentieth century residents were content to
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combat flooding with such band-aid solutions as installing a culvert or spanning a wash
with a small road bridge. Even after the great flood of 1955 that caused millions of
dollars in damage, residents of Clark County voted down a 1962 bond issue to fund an
Army Corps of Engineer-designed flood control project. Even in 1975 when devastating
floodwaters at Caesars Palace imperiled Las Vegas’ tourist image, the response remained
meager.
Indeed, there was no real effort to fund a valley-wide comprehensive solution to
flooding until 1985 when Clark County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury and State
Assemblyman Jim McGaughey assembled a small group of progressive-minded
politicians, engineers, and dedicated private citizens to promote the benefits of
developing a regional solution to flooding. Inspiring the group was a series of disastrous
floods during the early 1980s, which endangered residents, virtually shutdown the Strip,
ravaged old and new communities throughout the area, caused millions of dollars in
damages to public and private property, and resulted in loss of life. In particular, the
drowning of a two-week old baby girl, along with her entire family in September 1984
helped solidify Jim McGaughey’s dedication to push Nevada’s legislature to approve an
independent flood control district for Clark County. Bruce Woodbury led a year-long
political campaign to gain voter approval for the flood control district’s funding
mechanism. Even though flood-related deaths and massive property damage continued to
occur over the next two-decades, 1985 became the watershed for community action. Las
Vegas finally took responsibility for protecting life and property in their metropolitan
area.
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By the mid-1980s, Strip executives, politicians, civic groups and community
leaders recognized that something had to be done. In 1986, with more than 500,000
residents, the valley finally had enough tax base to fund the flood control district with an
increase in the county’s sales tax. With growing support for a regional flood control
solution, in September of 1986 county residents overwhelming approved a dedicated
funding mechanism to build a multi-billion dollar system of basins and channels that
many officials estimated could take over a half-century to complete. The creation of the
Clark County Regional Flood Control District not only produced a blueprint for change,
but also symbolized the growing willingness of the four cities and Clark County to work
together for the common good. A handful of visionary local and state politicians molded
the flood control district into an independent government agency, making it the first
special use district in Clark County not controlled by a specific jurisdiction.
Representatives from all the local entities came together, without the fear of relinquishing
their political control to a rival, and finally began making progress on a comprehensive
mitigation system. The new legislation appointed a group of committed private citizens to
monitor and oversee the funding of projects, while a separate committee of technical
advisors, comprised of public works department officials, prioritized projects to ensure
that the regional system was not high-jacked or manipulated for political gain. After
decades of feuding over tax revenues, sewer districts, fire and police services, and
regional planning, the politically fragmented metropolis had matured enough that
officials and residents finally came together in a cooperative spirit to solve a problem that
threatened them all.
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The Las Vegas valley’s unique geography and the unpredictable nature of flash
floods in the arid southwest will always require proactive stormwater mitigation to
protect lives and property. Even during economic downturns, fluctuating environmental
policies and threats to the longevity of its dedicated sales tax revenues, the district
continues to provide funding for construction of new facilities and the maintenance of the
existing system, as it invests to safeguard the community. It is vitally important that
future residents recognize the potential for larger and even deadlier storms to strike the
valley. As more channels are installed and basins built, the hazards of a 100-year event
will continue to decrease, but flood control officials speculate that the region’s weather
patterns could still produce 200-year and even 500-year floods, potentially over-flowing
the metropolitan system. Still, the Clark County Flood Control District has accomplished
a lot in its first quarter century of life. It has forever transformed the physical layout of
the Las Vegas metropolitan area by correcting decades of mistakes embodied in the old
patchwork approach to flooding. In the process it has greatly improved the quality of life
for all Las Vegas area residents while also providing a safe blueprint for future growth.
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APPENDEX I

Break down of projects for the first eight years of the CCRFCD Master Plan
Las Vegas Review Journal, February 14, 1987.
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APPENDEX II
IRB Approval
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